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state: family policies and gender gap 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Given the Esping-Andersen’s comparative analysis of the welfare states in 
Western Europe, this thesis studies the link between his categorization and the 
Italian welfare structure. In doing so, it follows the analysis suggested by Adema 
on the basis of SOCX data, i.e. the OECD Social Expenditure Database which 
provides international indicators on public and private (mandatory and voluntary) 
social expenditure. The focus is on the Italian case, with occasional reference to 
OECD countries, and on family-friendly policies concerning the reconciliation of 
work and family care and gender equality. 
Finally, it looks at the relationships between female employment rate, public 
social expenditure and gender pay gap in Italy from 1997 to 2013. 
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Introduction 
What is the meaning of public welfare? 
There were many historically contingent examples of welfare state over time, from the 
English Poor Laws in XVI century to the aftermath of Weimar democracy (1919-1933), 
each of which strongly contributed to give those who will come after a greater awareness 
of one of the most important 1990s key policy issue.  
According to one of the first definitions provided by the German economist Adolph 
Wagner in 1879, a welfare state is the government expenditure for social services as an 
evolution of the free market capitalism: people needed an increase in social protection, 
public interventions and welfare functions, so to induce qualitative changes of developing 
institutions and social structures. As a set of government programs, it aimed at promoting 
and making provisions for citizens’ economic and social well-being, allowing for the 
occupational, industrial and financial features of each society. Individual households’ 
actions, activities of local communities, charitable organizations or the free market 
mechanisms were no longer sufficient ways to provide welfare and distribute well-being: 
at one point governments accepted the responsibility for the promotion of a universal 
welfare for its citizens, which, otherwise, wouldn’t be sustainable and independent.  
Demographic, social and economic analysis are essential for the European welfare regime 
evolution: how they evolve from their current complexity to their future building depends 
– inter alia – on migratory tendencies, institutions, developmental policies and political 
stability. Consider another definition which places the accent on a further issue: according 
to Asa Briggs, the welfare state « (…) guarantees individual and families a minimum 
income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second, by 
narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain 
social contingencies which lead otherwise to crises; third, by ensuring that all citizens 
without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a 
certain agreed range of social services». So, the relief of poverty comes not necessarily 
first, but this is certainly one of the key objectives which any welfare regime must 
achieve: they should provide a sense of security at all.  
A wide range of definitions, by making clear some closely related concepts - social policy, 
old age, households, insecurity, state intervention - provides a quite full picture of what is 
the topic discussed here: the Italian welfare system in providing, whether successfully or 
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not, family care policies aimed at ensure an easy and efficient reconciliation of work and 
family care. In Italy, where aggregate social spending is relatively high (ca. 28,4% of GDP 
in 2013 against the average across the OECD),  the perception of the social policy 
functioning, including the public spending family and childcare, is definitely not 
satisfactory. Since the beginning of crisis in 2007/2008, social spending increased to 22% 
of GDP in 2009 on average across the OECD countries. Population ageing is the major 
reason why pension and health expenditure go up for ensuring a growing social support 
thus taking many resources away from other welfare branches. Political decisions and 
economic actions, reforms and financial crisis, are equally responsible for the final status 
of multiple inefficiencies currently affecting the whole country. The welfare state is not a 
drag on productivity.  Some scholars argue that the taxes required to finance it endanger 
productivity. While it is true that taxes drag down economic incentives, the expenditures 
that the taxes finance can increase productivity.  
In the chapters that follow we focus on the OECD countries, especially on the European 
welfare system as it represents the heart of social policy. A brief description of  the four 
main welfare regimes provides a comprehensive overview of the Southern countries to 
which Italy actually belongs. The fifth welfare regime involving the Eastern Europe is 
neglected. Then, towards a bottom-up approach, the analysis passes from the Southern 
welfare regime to the Italian case by the valuable tools of OECD Social Expenditure 
database on Family and EUROSTAT dataset. Welfare inefficiencies and unbalanced use 
of resources explain the attempt to compare family policies in a constantly changing 
country which needs to fill gaps (not only in terms of wages) in gender issues to face the 
crisis of competitiveness and peculiarities of its labour market.  
To this end it seeks to estimate the interactions between the female employment rate in 
Italy and some socio-economic variables from 1997 to 2013 in order to build a bridge 
between  the issue of family wellbeing and the one of the labour market (gender wage 
gap) fully in accordance with the reconciliation of work and family responsibilities.  
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“Let us never forget that government is ourselves  
and not an alien power over us” 
[F. D. Roosevelt] 
 
 
1  European Welfare States: Merits and limitations 
of the Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare 
 
1.1  Typologies of Welfare States  
 
Before listing the European social indicators of citizens’ well-being, which will be 
discussed below, the explanation of a brief literature survey of the welfare state regimes 
throughout the last forty years would be suitable for getting a more accurate sense of the 
Italian case. Until the 1970s only few economists tackled unemployment insurance, 
reforms of social security and retirement pensions. Indeed, a great deal of interest has been 
rediscovered by the economic literature only in recent years: reforms of the welfare state 
are one of the most debated issues in the OECD countries, where social security has to be 
basically cut in order to restore fiscal losses of national governments. European countries 
are taking on the thorny challenge of accomplishing goals even though certain programs 
have been -or will be- frozen. This need –that almost seems urgency, at least for any in-
trouble economies- has been requiring a new role of the welfare state within the broader 
context of the fiscal and financial European crisis. The welfare state expansion itself runs 
along two major paradigms: the social and economic factors on the one hand, and the 
political factors on the other.  
The way to measure the welfare state is an accurate combination of the quantitative 
methodology and a more qualitative approach. Selecting the appropriate welfare state 
variables and identifying statistical indicators -observable and measurable- on 
determinants, impact of reforms and extensiveness of economic policies is the best way to 
proceed. The conceptualization of the main social actors’ role and their interactions, at the 
same time, allows for a comprehensive analysis of the public policy, also because of the 
normative question that what is “welfare” for one group could be a disadvantage for 
others. Therefore, the way to measure it depends on two dimensions: welfare effort and 
welfare outcomes. The former refers to the size of resources spent on social, fiscal and 
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economic policies and it is captured by aggregate data on social expenditures as 
percentage of GDP and disaggregated data on different social programs affecting different 
social needs. The latter refers to the outcome of social programs through well-being and 
single indicators as Gini coefficient, poverty rate, job security, youth NEET rates, etc. All 
the above mentioned indicators are extracted by the OECD Social Expenditure Database, 
developed in order to provide comparable statistics on public and private (mandatory and 
voluntary) social expenditure aiming to monitor trends and composition of public policy 
programs. One further variable is a relevant measure of the welfare state: the level of 
generosity in terms of eligibility and extensiveness. Measures of program eligibility are 
needed to estimate the participation rates, to monitor change in the number of participants 
in case of an expansion or reduction in the pool of people eligible for benefits and to 
evaluate the impact of a program.  
One of the most accepted and well-known categorization of welfare regimes is that 
provided by Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) in his The Three worlds of welfare capitalism, 
inspired in turn by Richard Titmuss’ classification, laid down in a very rough description 
in What is Social policy? (1974). Titmuss’ contribution was highly influential: he defined 
what we now call “social policy” and shaped the post-war welfare state, although he never 
produced a coherent theory of welfare. All individuals have “basic needs” and “necessary 
mutual relations” as a consequence of their belonging to a community. A constant political 
debate is done to set the list of needs – evolving over time by definition– how to measure 
them and the cost of supporting those needs by the state. He set out three basic models of 
social policy, according to different arrangements of state, market and family. 
 
Residual Welfare Model 
Given the existence of two “natural channels”, i.e. the private market and the family, then 
the social welfare institutions should intervene just temporarily and only if the formers are 
unable to meet the social needs. In other words, «the true object of this Welfare State is to 
teach people how to do without it». Therefore it is the least developed form of welfare 
state, where social welfare services are subordinated to a market-oriented approach and 
the residual model is configured to provide for the lowest public welfare activity through a 
minimalist outlook, sometimes limiting its social scope to help alleviate poverty.  
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Industrial Achievement-Performance Model 
Known as the Handmaiden Model, the role for social welfare institutions is more 
significant than before and where the satisfaction of the social needs is met «on the basis 
of merit, work performance and productivity».  
 
Institutional-Redistributive Model 
It is the only model where the social values gain over the economic market. The social 
welfare is seen as «a major integrated institution in society, providing universalist services 
outside the market on the principle of need». It can be considered the most developed 
welfare regime, where the social welfare services are the normal functions of society. 
 
 
 
However, Timuss’ contribution was rather a social and political work on the boundaries of 
the welfare state. The need for a technical rather than just socio-political discussion 
allowed the distinction between ends and means: how the redistribution of income and 
wealth should be in order to shift resources from the rich to the poor?  The social policy 
models designed by Titmuss lacked those dimensions needed to offer clear guidelines in 
the identification of clusters, which were much better designed by Esping-Andersen in his 
most influential work.  
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1.2  Theoretical framework: Esping-Andersen’s The three worlds of 
welfare 
 
Esping-Andersen conducted a comparative historical analysis on welfare policy in 18 
OECD countries up to the 1980s. Better yet, he indicates three “defining dimensions” in 
order to better understand the assessment and generosity of a welfare state, which also are 
the main indicators as measurements of the social services provided. These dimensions 
govern the direction of social policies and are commonly related to the principles of 
equality and security.  
 
1) Degree of de-commodification 
First theorized by Polanyi (1980) in the form of the capitalism vice of treating labor as any 
other commodity, it is the citizen’s (social) process of immunization from being reliant on 
the market as a sort of commodity. In other words «the extent to which individuals and 
families can maintain a normal and socially acceptable standard of living regardless of 
their market performance. It is in this sense that social rights diminish citizens’ status as 
commodities» (1990, Esping-Andersen). There are ways for measuring the degree of de-
commodification that a country provides to its citizens: the rules governing the eligibility 
to welfare benefits;  the replacement income level to people experiencing unemployment; 
and the range of social services which make them able to participate in the labour market 
(e.g. childbearing). 
The less privatized the benefits, the greater the degree of decommodification. The prime 
aim is to find a longstanding feature of countries, including the second dimension as well, 
although his analysis is based on cross-sectional data for a brief period of time, i.e. 1980. 
  
2) Stratification 
«One’s status as a citizen will compete with one’s class position». It indicates whether 
welfare state support or reduce status differences between social and economic groups. 
The social stratification as thought out by Esping-Andersen does not deal with women and 
the gender issue in employment, but just with class and social status in a society: the 
access to benefits are granted on the basis of occupational or family status. It is another 
way for the identification of clusters in the theory on welfare which Scruggs and Allan 
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(2006) explore by replicating the main indices of social stratification in terms of «social 
policy’s propensity to order social relations».  
 
3) Social citizenship 
In one of his clusters - the world of the Scandinavian countries - the citizenship is at the 
core of the welfare state and identified by the commitment to universalism of individual 
rights. Indeed, the access to the welfare-state benefits could be granted on the basis of 
individual rights (social citizenship, «rather than performance») on the basis of needs or 
on the basis of the family unit. 
According to Esping-Andersen, the mere presence of a -though good- social insurance 
does not automatically mean being in the way of de-commodifying, if the workers’ market 
dependency still holds. Consider, for example, the German case: it led the way in 
developing social programmes but over the last century it could not be said to seek any 
kind of de-commodification mechanism. Consequently, given the complementary 
relationship between them, he argues that the de-commodifying welfare states are 
substantially recent.  
Furthermore, the relief of poverty comes not necessarily first, but this is one of many goals 
which any welfare regime must achieve: they should provide a sense of security at all. The 
welfare state, indeed, deals with not just the inequality structure, but also with the 
stratification degree of society as an active force (Esping-Andersen, 1999).  
In light of several critiques to his male-centered welfare state theory in 1990, he later paid 
greater attention to the concept of familialism -or defamiliarization- which the author 
defines along two opposite directions: the public policies aimed at families and the welfare 
burden suffered by the families. In Family Formation and Family Dilemmas in 
Contemporary Europe he says  
 
Familialism reflects a traditional view of what pro-family policy means. Families face new 
and often more intense social risks which they increasingly lack the means to cope with. 
This results in welfare lacunae unless market or government provision steps in. Market 
failure is the rule rather than the exception for social welfare. Further private welfare incurs 
serious information asymmetries. If families and markets fail in tandem, public support is, 
by definition, the last alternative (ch.6, 2007) 
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In this work Esping-Andersen recognizes a wider role of family and market, in addition to 
government, in the management of social risks. It focuses on the demographic changes 
affecting fertility, gender equality, childbearing over the world and tries to prove whether 
the institutional context of a country explained as «the fact of living in a particular country 
with a given welfare state» influences in some way the motherhood decisions. This 
comparative analysis results in a difficulty in clustering different societies associated to 
aged population to find common fertility trends: while, for example, women’s 
employment show a negative impact on childbirth for countries like Italy and Spain, the 
same has a positive impact in Scandinavian countries, especially in the case of Denmark 
where family-friendly policies and female economic independence ensure a career path as 
mothers. The decision to have a baby, given the common growing trend of the delay of 
motherhood and average fewer children than the previous cohorts, is strictly dependent on 
the perception of labour market uncertainty and the need for self-realization.  
 
At the micro level most women need to meet a minimum set of conditions before engaging 
in motherhood. This set of conditions may include job stability, a minimum income level, 
adequate housing and time flexibility (Esping-Andersen, 2007). 
According to these criteria, the three worlds of Western welfare regimes clustered by his 
analysis are the following:  
 
1) Liberal welfare regime 
Mainly prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries (Usa, Canada, United Kingdom and 
Australia), it is typified by the prevalence of the market as the leading actor in the risk 
coverage and by the least de-commodifying structure (while the Scandinavian by the 
most). Modest universal transfers and slim social insurance plans are connotative 
elements: this means that governments put all benefits into the lower class and concentrate 
its forces to the market growth, «either passively -by guaranteeing only a minimum- or 
actively –by subsidizing private welfare schemes». This fact implies that not all the risk 
categories are covered by public intervention, which, on the contrary, focuses on the 
proper indigents, eligible for help on the basis of the means test.  
It minimizes the de-commodification effects by encouraging the market to guarantee and 
subsidize private welfare schemes because it embraces the idea that a free market allows 
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individual to achieve their potential. It builds an order of stratification establishing a 
bipolar political backdrop between poor, usually working-class state dependent, and rich 
people as the wealthy people who are the majority able to guard against risks by 
themselves (for example, buying an insurance policy); hence, it carries the socially far-
reaching consequence of a «negative public stigma» for working-class recipients due to 
the meager benefits allocated to them and encourages a higher degree of social 
stratification. 
 
The following Figures 1-2-3 show the pattern of the public social expenditure across three 
groups of countries: the liberal countries (Australia, Canada, UK and US), the 
conservative group (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Netherlands) and the 
Nordic group (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden).  
 
Fig. 1: Public social expenditure (cash benefits + benefits in kind) as a percent of GDP, 
                1980-2014, liberal countries  
 
Source: OECD-SOCX 
 
 
A typical example that perfectly fits this welfare regime model as for de-commodification 
is the United Kingdom: according to Esping-Andersen, the index of de-commodification 
degree is 23.4 as a total sum of  pensions (8.5), sickness benefits (7.2) and unemployment 
insurance (7.7) scores. Conversely, a medium-low level of social stratification has been 
found by Scruggs and Allan (2008): they replicate the same indices used by Esping-
Andersen to evaluate both stratification and decommodification by using more recent 
available data and their findings turn away from The Three Worlds results.  
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2) Conservative welfare state  
Mainly present in Austria, France, Germany and Italy, it drops the «liberal obsession of 
market efficiency and commodification» preventing the status differentials (both 
economical and social) in society: its aim is to collectivize risks through family, local 
communities or charitable organizations, according to the individual’s own status. 
Different status matches different measures. In this after-defined corporatist welfare, the 
differentiated programmes reflect the proportion of the amount paid out by wage-earners 
to their own social security trust funds and the most common ways of social service 
provision confirm with a Catholic social thought, the principle of subsidiarity: the state 
should intervene only in those cases which are beyond the individual’s capacity. Hence, 
the private insurance plays a negligible role and the corporatist regime is also shaped by 
the influence of the Church, especially in the preservation of traditional family hood.  
With regard to the stratification process, in spite of the persistently high level of public 
expenditure in corporatist countries, the impact on income redistribution is negligible. A 
conservative regime reproduces class and status differentials through different schemes for 
different working groups.  
 
Fig. 2: Public social expenditure (cash benefits + benefits in kind) as a percent of GDP, 
1980-2014, conservative countries  
 
Source: OECD-SOCX 
 
3) Social democratic welfare regime 
Exemplified by the Scandinavian countries, it is the one in which the de-commodification 
trend covers also the middle-classes and the state makes social security choices depending 
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on the principle of universalism: social services are provided on the strength of the 
citizenship right, unlike the previous case. «The social democrats pursued a welfare state 
that would promote an equality of the highest standards, not an equality of minimal needs 
as pursued elsewhere»; this allows to overcome the bipolarity between state and market 
(as expected in the liberal regime-type) or between working-class and middle-class (as a 
result of the conservative one). Since all are benefitted, then all feel obliged to participate 
to tax levies. According to Esping-Andersen, this model can be seen as a fusion between 
socialism and liberalism, in the sense that its main goal is «not to maximize dependence 
on the family, but capacities for individual independence». The most peculiar aspect, 
indeed, is encouraging the active -functional- effort to de-commodify the individual well-
being by playing down the dependence on the market: the state is committed to full 
employment through the welfare ambition coinciding with the work issue.   
 
Fig. 3: Public social expenditure (cash benefits + benefits in kind) as a percent of GDP, 
1980-2014, Nordic countries 
 
Source: OECD-SOCX 
 
Once shown the essential guidelines of the alternative welfare states found by Esping-
Andersen analysis –the social rights, the degree of stratification and the relationship 
between state, market and family- it is clear that no regime is a pure type, neither the 
Scandinavian nor the liberal one: each of them contains a mixture of several elements, just 
like the conservative European system which combines liberal and social democratic 
ingredients. 
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1.3  Limitations of the Esping-Andersen’s typologies 
 
1.3.1  Ferrera’s South European model of welfare 
 
Many scholars have been testing the empirical robustness of Esping-Andersen’s 
classification. One of the most controversial points, as is evident from the description 
above, is the lacking distinction between the conservative welfare regime and the one 
across the Southern countries. In particular, two main criticisms can be made: 
a. Within the same cluster Esping-Andersen includes as different welfare states as 
Germany, France, Austria and Italy. Such within-regime variation is larger than the other 
two types [Alber 2001].  
b. What about Spain, Portugal and Greece? Esping-Andersen did not include countries 
like Greece, Spain and  Portugal. By the time of Esping-Andersen they were considered as 
late-comers and not covered at all.  
This inaccuracy has led Ferrera to introduce the inclusion of two further welfare models in 
1993. Just like Esping-Andersen did, Ferrera finds four other dimensions to define new 
clusters: the rules of access (eligibility rules), the conditions for benefits, the mechanisms 
regulating social protections, and the management of several social security schemes.   
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Following Ferrera, although some features are still controversial, the existence of the 
Southern European welfare state - Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, should be kept 
separate from the other models because of  
  the highly fragmented system of social protection  
  the distinct clientelism 
  the under-development of some social services like childcare support and early 
education services 
  the institution of family as provider of welfare 
  the highly fragmented labour market in the insider-outsider dualism 
  some very generous social protection benefits such as old-age pensions. 
Despite twenty years having passed since Ferrera’s formal categorization of 
Mediterranean families and welfare states, his work still seems acceptable in the current 
context of social policies and economic functioning of welfare in Italy.   
The countries belonging to this regime have a high level of social protection provided by 
the breadwinner, with a limited recourse to private social insurance against risks and a 
highly regulated labour market thus stressing “residualism”. Conversely, the countries 
most typically conservative and belonging to the continental (Bismarckian) Europe such 
as Germany and Austria have other specific features: despite the strong emphasis on the 
principle of subsidiarity, the residual role of the state intervention never implied the rise of 
the family as responsible for the social needs.  
Considering the specific issue of family welfare and the de-familisation process - which 
will be deepened in the following chapter - there are several good reasons why countries 
should invest in childcare services. First, the access to high quality childcare services 
support a higher female participation rate, which, in turn, promotes gender equality and a 
higher fertility rate so improving the effectiveness of an ageing population’s welfare state. 
Looking at these relationships among gender, labour market and family welfare, there are 
some additional principles which, if embedded into the previous set of dimensions, would 
produce different outcomes: a) the commodification, in terms of employability of women 
and mothers and, on a broader level, of those individuals who have difficulties in 
participating in the labour market; b) the familialism, as the way in which the welfare 
system deals with familial care; and c) the de-gendering of employment and care, in terms 
of gender equality promotion and female carer family model. Then the continental welfare 
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state is no longer a one-off block. France and Belgium are both characterized by a degree 
of de-familisation so high that they are closer to the Scandinavian welfare typology (Neyer 
2012). In this view the reconciliation between care and work is one of their primary goal.  
 
Table 1: Aggregate Social Expenditure and Gini coefficient for conservative countries 
according to Esping-Andersen’s theory 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of OECD database  
 
Looking at economic inequality, a simple statistical measure for the purpose of 
comparison of how income resources are distributed across countries is the Gini-
coefficient (Table 1). 
The dispersion of income within each country in 2011, ranging from 0,28 (Austria) to 0,32 
(Italy), is quite similar and this comes not as a surprise: it does only confirm that one 
crucial point of these welfare regimes is the marginal re-distributional impact of their 
social spending, which is assumed still persistent and common despite evolutionary trends 
in recent years. So they mainly -the only exception is Germany- display a common 
upward trend in the Gini index, and, particularly for Italy, an increasing social expenditure 
over the last years.  
 
Furthermore, it is useful to consider the literature on the implementation of family policies 
in Germany and Austria, where the old housewife model of the male breadwinner family 
is now outdated and has been gradually replaced by a «full integration of women and men 
into paid economic activity» with a high percentage of work interruptions by women as 
mothers who temporarily turn into part-time work for childcare reasons [Oorschot, 
Opielka, Effinger 2008]. The change of the family model over time in such countries is 
strictly due to the emergence of new cultural values for family and gender relations, where 
women play the primary role of childcare provider without having to leave the economic 
independence. So also the cultural context of the conservative countries differentiates 
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Germany and Austria from Italy. Also the same Catholic doctrine in Italy and Germany 
can produce different welfare state outcomes. How did the same religion produce different 
impact on the development of welfare institutions in Italy and Germany? Hien (2012) 
found that  
 
The answer has been found in the different dynamics of ideational competition. While 
Germany saw the emergence of a virtuous cycle of ideational competition, through 
which the Catholic Church was stimulated to develop a modern catholic welfare 
concept, Italian Catholicism was caught in a vicious ideational cycle and did not 
develop modern social security ideas during the early years of national consolidation 
after unification. This means that the growth of the labor movement does not directly 
determine the shape and form of the welfare state, but that such modernizing factors 
are mediated through the ideational competition that they stimulate on social security 
ideas. 
 
Second, the issue of the Catholic social doctrine has been given a big role in Esping-
Andersen’s analysis. However, although the conservative-continental regime effectively 
was set up by the principles of Catholicism and the region that stretches from Northern 
Italy to the Netherlands and beyond saw the origin of Christian Democratic parties, 
another religious movement and its relative Reformation against  the Roman Catholic 
Church had a huge impact. The Protestantism involved Germany, the Netherlands and 
Great Britain and it was ignored by Esping-Andersen, as well as the fact that in Spain, 
Portugal and Greece no one Christian Democratic party emerged in their political 
backdrop. If Esping-Andersen’s regime scheme had been based also on the role of 
Protestantism rather than exclusively on Catholicism in western welfare state 
development, the empirical results would have been different and would also attach great 
importance to the persistent impact of the neglected variable as was Protestantism’s social 
doctrine. Just think of the cases of the Netherlands, Switzerland and Great Britain which 
hardly do come under the conventional three welfare regime’s typology [Manow 2004]. 
 
The role of France in this perspective has been deliberately neglected: whether France 
should be included or not in the model of Southern Europe is still at issue because the 
geographical boundaries of the welfare model are highly debated. Most of the French 
cultural context and the social mentality appear to be close to the Mediterranean case and 
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the institutional features are quite similar to Italy [Ferrera 1997]. What mainly 
distinguishes France from Italy is the process of modernization, the high-fertility rate 
(German speaking and Southern countries are low-fertility regions) and a high degree of 
de-familisation, as well as Belgium, thus making it closer to the Nordic countries. 
 
1.3.2  The concept of de-familisation  
Many successive critics take position against the analysis above and state that it gives a 
very partial framework of the welfare state development: they observe an underestimation 
of the role of local institutions in favor of an excessive weight to the de-commodifying 
process and, in general, to those changes occurring in the free market. The praise of the 
social democratic regime itself by Esping-Andersen denotes a too much ideological 
analysis at the expense of a merely descriptive and realistic approach: it gives so much 
importance to the relationship between state and market that it almost seems he nullifies 
(or marginalize) the role of family and forgets to provide a further distinction element 
among them based on the concept of defamilisation, which he then will introduce in his 
exposition (Esping-Andersen 2000): it distinguishes between countries in which there is a 
strong family dependency and those ones in which the role of family is minimized. 
Obviously, the social democratic regimes shows the highest degree of defamiliarization, 
while the most conservatory welfare states (the Mediterranean countries like Italy and 
Greece) exhibits a lower defamiliarization trend with a marked assignment of welfare 
duties to the most basic social institution. In fact, many years before Esping-Andersen 
tripolar scheme, Polanyi -founder of the economic anthropology- investigates the concept 
of embeddedness (1974), introducing the idea that economic relations could be understood 
only in their historical context. With respect to the previous model, it places great 
emphasis on the historical transformations occurring in both the stabilizing and growth 
stages of each welfare state: this second approach leads to comprise no longer three 
regimes as seen before, but an additional fourth case, which is called familistic welfare 
state. Greece is a typical example, since it well exemplifies an economy in which the 
family plays a multiple role: it de facto is the main provider of welfare to its members and 
the main social institution consolidating the political economy and the welfare capitalism. 
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It represents a sort of social security cushion, which even provides de-commodification 
when it needs to redistribute social resources among its members. 
In Beblavý, Thum and Veselkova (2011) education and welfare policies are the greatest 
measures adopted to intervene in the stratification process and to reduce inequality. In 
trying to prove the effectiveness of the «one-policy-fits-all» approach in the stratification 
process, through the implementation of education policies which play a central role to test 
the traditional theory of Three worlds, they try to pick out which countries intentionally 
reproduce social stratification through educational policies and which, conversely, break 
up the stratification process. Is there a trade-off between the two measures at issue? 
According to which institution is concerned with them – whether the state or the market 
and family – and on the basis of the role of public policy, OECD countries can be grouped 
into different clusters: market-oriented, egalitarian, state-oriented, mixed. Inequality can 
be twofold: inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity. The first one concerns 
the transfer of income or wealth from rich people to the poorer; the second one refers to 
the people’s «chance to achieve the same outcome». In other words, they developed 
educational model clusters which are compared with the traditional Esping-Andersen’s 
welfare regimes by looking at the interactions between educational and welfare policies.  
 
Table 2: Explicit stratification vs. equality in the public system 
 
Source: Beblavy, Thum and Veselkova 
 
As seen in Table 2, one of the simplest findings by Beblavy, Thum and Veselkova in 
capturing the stratification in the public system is that the majority of countries can be 
assigned to a mixed cluster: when equality in education policy matches stratification in 
pensions, then it is the case of «equality in opportunity, not in outcomes», and vice versa. 
In doing so, they chosen a set of indicators suggested by the PISA findings such as 
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extracurricular activities and learning time, in order to show how the socio-economic 
background is linked to the educational performance.  
In light of the Esping-Andersen’s framework, Beblavy, Thum and Veselkova show that 
«educational stratification seems to be more common in conservative countries than in 
social-democratic welfare regimes». The reason behind lies in several indicators 
concerning both the education and pension system. In terms of educational streaming 
between schools, it is low in Nordic countries and high in the conservative and 
Mediterranean regimes, where streaming means the approach of assigning students to 
different – and, sometimes, rigid – groups according to their ability, which is extremely 
high in UK so as to report a big comeback in Anglo-Saxon education system during latest 
years. In terms of pension system, the Mediterranean countries, quite similar to the 
conservative cluster, have the least egalitarian pension system, while the liberal countries 
have the most.  
 
One further caveat to the Esping-Andersen’s seminal work deserves to be pointed out: the 
emergence of a new welfare state typology within Central and Eastern Europe which are 
actually being developed and still at the stage of definition. The debate on the post-
socialist welfare policies in Eastern Europe and former URSS is still open and here 
deliberately neglected. They do not fit any Esping-Andersen’s typology nor converge into 
one of the Western example of social protection model. 
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“The southern welfare states do not only share similar characteristics and  
a similar genesis, but also are currently confronted by similar  
developmental challenges of both external  
and internal nature” 
[Ferrera, 1996] 
 
 
2  The South European model 
 
The South European (SE) family model and care regime, together with a common welfare 
system and socio-economic trajectories, is based on some specific features, discussed by a 
wide literature, involving the Esping-Andersen’s omission about the existence of the 
fourth social policy model made up of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece.  
The South European countries is included into the familialist welfare state: as will be later 
discussed, the role of the family in all these countries still has relevant implications in 
terms of gender employment, the rise of generations living long together with their 
parents, the spread of clientelistic networks, family-oriented attitudes (Guerrero and 
Naldini, 1997), the existence of political influences on the public providers’ management 
and the so-called «third-payer» issue, due to the structural excess of demand and to the 
complexity in recognizing real needs (Ferrera 1996). In addition to these social trends, 
most of which are related to the collusive mix of  public and private institutions, further 
common economic factors contribute to define a distinct SE welfare regime:  
 
A faulty labor market which generates irregularity and employment failures, for example 
as the labor market segmentation in the case of Spanish dualism. A series of ineffective 
labour market reforms and the ongoing lack of flexicurity have caused the perpetuation 
of the insider-outsider model in Spain. This issue is very clearly illustrated by the 
example of both workers in firms with less than six employees and temporary workers 
with less than one month of work who are not entitled to vote in firm-level union 
elections, that is one single opportunity to stand up for a permanent contract and higher 
wages against their precarity (Dolado 2010, 2012). Bentolila, Dolado and Jimenez 
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(2012) for Spain evaluated the impact of the one-single open ended contract (contrato 
ùnico) on the job creation and in terms of collective bargaining and EPL: the high 
segmentation is the main cause of the huge employment and unemployment volatility 
and the introduction of a single contract for new hires would reduce the marginal cost of 
contract extensions against the current dual EPL regulation, prevent the high turnover of 
temporary workers ensuring a long entry phase with low hiring costs, at the same time. 
Furthermore, their positions on the triggered labour reforms recently discussed in 
countries like Portugal and Greece is highly hindered by external pressure of 
international financial markets.   
Discussions on the Portuguese labour market are very similar: the segmentation is 
mainly caused by the degree of employment protection, which varies by contract type 
and is very high in open-ended contracts. Such segmentation prompts a downward spiral 
of low returns to human capital and poor match productivity, which, in turn, leads to low 
wages mobility. Permanent contracts enjoy higher returns to tenure, but workers on 
fixed-term contracts are, actually, much more educated and skilled (Centeno and Novo, 
2012).  
Fig. 4: Share of temporary employees as percentage of total employees aged 15-64 
 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey 
 
In Italy the dual structure of the labour market is associated to a problem of stabilization 
of temporary workers: in order to break down dualism, an effective reform should focus 
on the demand side by, first, encouraging firms to increase the flexibility at entry, 
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though always seen as a tool to reduce the fixed cost component of labour. Second, good 
reforms should promote long-term employment prospect through the modeling of an 
appropriate open-ended single contract: «open-ended» does not mean that cannot be 
broken but rather that, in case of dismissal within the first 3 months of tenure, firms must 
pay a monetary compensation to worker and that the employment protection increases 
smoothly with worker’s tenure (Garibaldi and Turrini, 2013).  
In Greece the issue of labour market segmentation has increasingly been at the centre of 
discussion by policy makers, especially for what concerns youth unemployment and 
gender inequality for work opportunities. Greece has the highest youth unemployment 
rate across the OECD countries and is one of the most badly performing labour market: 
58.3% of youth labour force ages 15-24 in 2013, followed by Spain (55.5%), Italy (40%) 
and Portugal (38.1%). On the one hand, working in the public sector provides high 
social benefits and strong employment protection, although the partial liberalization is 
being caused a reduction of its degree of protection for young and newly-hired workers. 
On the other hand, the majority of Greek workers are typically employed in small-sized 
non-public firms, especially for building and tourism sectors. Greece has faced the 
financial crisis and the economic downturn thus adopting austerity measures also 
imposed by the “Troika”. The way to deal with the economic recession, that hit young 
people very hard, has been a gradual deregulation of employment legislation in terms of 
collective bargaining, minimum wages, benefits and social protection. In particular, 
Anagnostopoulos and Siebert (2012) analyzed the impact of employment protection 
legislation and minimum wage for temporary employment, so to evaluate how firms 
react to a change of legal constraints. The result is that labour law matters and that the 
OECD’S statement (2007, p. 98 ) that «the poor labour market performance in Greece is 
principally due to rigidities in labour market institutions» is confirmed: the regression 
analysis, by showing a positive and significant correlation, confirms that firms prefer 
temporary contracts  because such workers are easy to fire and that the percentage of 
family workers employed in a workplace of low wages and no minimum wage is 
negatively affected by collective bargaining coverage. Hence, family workers are 
considered as a form of flexible employment that have a special attraction for small 
firms. In fact, female employees in Greece represents the second most vulnerable 
category of workers both in terms of insecurity and low wages: it’s a male-dominated 
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labour market where women bear an unbalanced burden of a biased occupational 
distribution.  
Many economists agree on the negative impact of the increasing labour market dualism 
in SE countries on their low productivity rates. The fragmented nature of labour markets 
(which may consist of  high-waged versus low-waged workers, male versus female 
workers, and other segments or sub-markets set by job, age or industry) does not only 
mean distortions in the match of demand and supply side of labour causing multiple 
failures of labour market institutions. It also influences the productivity growth, in a 
vicious cycle of low investment in education, technology and competitiveness. 
Overcoming the labour market segmentation in SE countries would require an active 
intervention on the employment protection legislation. However, the most distinctive 
traits of the Italian segmentation still today refer both to the «polarized» protection 
system offered to different sectors and to the prevalence of temporary contracts as is 
particularly high in Spain and Portugal: the gap between labour force employed in 
institutional and regular market and the larger non-institutional sectors (Ferrera, 1996), 
which will be discussed in a few chapters. Particularly for Italy, labour market reforms 
have failed in the specific attempt to increase job opportunities for young agents so 
making the dualism even worse. Combining the flexibility in entry level and the higher 
flexibility in hiring conditions have caused a large number of young people in atypical 
work 
 The presence of clientelistic networks within the political system which produce 
favoritism mechanisms to advantage precise electoral groups (hence, specific 
occupational categories), especially in Greece and Italy. They share a common political 
functioning, often meaning a weakness of state institutions and the predominance of 
parties to aggregate social interests: public institutions in these countries are highly 
exposed to partisan pressures. The micro-clientelistic mode of the welfare state for 
electoral purposes can take either the form of political corruption, i.e. «illegal favours in 
exchange for private bribes» or the form of political clientelism, i.e. «favours exchanged 
for support to a given party in terms of votes» (Ferrera, 1996). Hence, the access to 
social welfare is subject to a close relationship between social and political groups, 
particularly at the local level and in those sectors characterized by a low employment 
demand and irregular black economy, such as the agricultural sector in Southern Italy. 
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 High barriers to terminations and poor unemployment benefits: the generosity of 
unemployment insurance, which varies according to factors like age and years of 
contribution, and the access to benefits are strict and non homogeneous.  
 Universal health care system, introduced between 70s and 80s in all four countries, in 
which the state provides both public and private services (the private health providers 
are authorized by regional authorities) and which, as known, causes a problem of 
financial sustainability of the National Health Service (NHS). In these countries, health 
care is almost a right of citizenship, based on universal membership, and follows a 
progressive universalistic approach, which takes on different characters across them, 
while private health insurance is negligible: in Greece a mixed system which combines 
occupational insurance schemes and NHS prevails. In Spain and Italy the established 
process of decentralization of the public healthcare system led to an almost full 
devolvement of power to the regions. In Portugal the tax-financed system is made up of 
NHS and other private and public health insurance subsystems. In all these countries the 
total public expenditure on health is lower than the average rate for Euro area countries 
(Figure 5): latest data for 2012 was measured in Greece at 6.26% , in Italy at 7.17%, in 
Portugal at 5.92% and in Spain at 7.08% of their GDP.  
 
Fig. 5: Public health expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, in South European countries, 
1995-2012 
 
   Source: Worldbank 
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Public health expenditure consists of recurrent spending from government budgets, 
including both local and central resources, and social health insurance funds. Austerity 
have imposed restrictive measures on healthcare in order to review the former criteria of 
equity, efficiency and universality. Expect for last years in Portugal, the shape of their 
expenditure curve is similar: they all have been affected by common drivers: demographic 
factors (age-structure of population, health status) which typically put upward pressure on 
health costs and non demographic factors (technology, prices, income growth and 
elasticity, that measures the responsiveness of health expenditure to a variation in 
income), taking into account the cost-containment program they have to be aware of. In 
Italy, the most critical issue concerns the regional gap between north and south area of the 
country in terms of different level of quality and quantity of services provided, so much 
that some national averages could be not significant. Moreover, Italy has to face 
corruption, cost inefficiencies and mismanagement of healthcare resources, which, 
unsurprisingly, affect the whole country.  
 
To sum up, with regard to the structure of the labour market in SE countries, the most 
relevant similarities identified across the four countries by many comparative studies and 
summed up by the International Labour Organization (ILO), are the following: 
 Low female employment rates in Italy, Greece and Spain, except Portugal 
 Expansion of informal (black economy) work 
 High rates of youth unemployment 
 Low unemployment rates among prime age men and older workers  
 Persistence of labour market segmentation with many types of duality in all 
countries, especially in Italy and Spain 
 
Whatever are the reasons of its distinctiveness, they have all been affected by massive 
reforms of the social security system to ensure the long-term financial sustainability, the 
universalist health-care system and gender equalities that are common to all. In particular, 
Greece and Portugal have both been affected by reforms of pension indexation 
mechanisms by freezing the automatic adjustments for all but the lowest earners and 
introducing new pension levies, which in the case of Greece meant cutting pensions 
greater than EUR 1.000 by between 5% and 15% according to pension income (OECD 
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2013, p.11).  Recent pension reforms in Greece, Italy and Portugal had different impact on 
the old-age pension benefits system. Figure 6 shows how the old age social expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP evolved from 1980 to 2011 as percentage of GDP in Portugal, in 
Italy, in Spain and in Greece.  
 
Fig. 6: Public social expenditure by Old Age, as a percentage of GDP, in South European 
countries 1980-2011 
 
Source: OECD-SOCX 
 
Table 3: Public and private expenditures on pension s as a percentage of GDP 
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Italy 13,5 13,9 13,9 14,0 14,5 15,4 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,3
Greece 10,8 11,8 11,8 12,1 12,4 13,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Spain 8,6 8,1 8,0 8,1 8,4 9,3 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,7
Portugal 7,9 10,3 10,6 10,7 11,3 12,3 0,9 1,4 1,0 0,7 0,8 0,5
 
Public expenditure Private expenditure
 
Source: OECD Factbook 2014 
 
Table 3 shows the public and private expenditure path in these Southern countries. Public 
spending on pensions come from the OECD-SOCX database, while private expenditures 
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come from the OECD Global Pension Statistics (GPS) database, which collects data from 
all types of private pension plans on persons working both in public and private sector.  
All of them are characterized by a very low share of pension expenditure on private basis, 
which in case of Greece is even almost zero. Greece is not able to develop a private 
pension scheme due to the pension fragmentation, inadequacy and expensive. They 
require efforts to reform the pension system in order to reduce the rapid expansion and to 
avoid common inefficiencies such as the overlapping of multiple pensions to people 
because of the fragmentation of the system and the inconsistent setting of eligibility 
criteria.  
2.1  From the welfare state to the welfare mix: the future of welfare 
societies in South European countries 
 
Despite the high public debts, the recurrent weakness of (nominal and real) GDP 
performance and lower competitiveness over time, all these countries experienced an 
expansionary trend of public social spending over the last decades thus facing a balancing 
of fiscal deficit and the almost constant need for spending reforms. They are all featured 
by the permanence of public/private mix. Hence, even when the economic boom of the 
70s was at nightfall and did not allow for further expansive social policies, the social 
expenditure remained high and the progressive development of welfare mix in Europe was 
to fulfill the need for finding a new equilibrium around the welfare programs. These 
macroeconomic targets ask for rather structural adjustments requiring a new policy 
governance and new kinds of welfare mix: one of the most relevant outcomes was the 
tendency to decentralize the provision of social services by increasing the power of local 
authorities, which also ensured a more cost-effective way of producing social benefits. 
Welfare services are dealt with as if they were private goods provided to individual 
citizens in contrast with those universally available (e.g. the defense or the public 
transportation).  A mixed welfare system is based on the interactions among the three 
main sources of welfare: the state, the market and the third sector. The latter is nothing but 
an intermediary which goes between the two social giants ensuring an efficient public role 
in civil societies: it is like a «hybrid» social interface which should direct the welfare state 
to the welfare society helping the state to adjust itself to new economic equilibria. The 
total welfare is nothing less the sum of these three sources. There are many mechanisms 
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used by the government to manage these interactions in the social services provision 
where sometimes it is the private sector that benefits from that.  
The principle of cooperation between several public, social and civil providers is based on 
the greater contribution of the third sector welfare mix policies in a way of collaboration 
and not competition. Indeed, one of the most discussed dilemma related to the private-
sector involvement in social welfare provision is the distinction between the cooperative 
relationship as «sharing responsibility» and as «delegation». It depends on how the co-
planning process is set up.  
 
With regards to healthcare, universal coverage is provided and financed with taxes in most 
countries, where the public/private mix of institutions is the most common (and, probably, 
efficient) mechanism to manage the complex organization of health care delivery. This 
blend varies widely across OECD countries and represents a balanced response to several 
needs and different constraints: first, the public authority is responsible for the regulation 
of supply, prices and fees and for setting priority levels, whilst the private structures 
ensure greater efficiency and resources rationalization through a leaning approach. 
Privatization can be adapted to different modes of public/private mix, from private 
ownership of the structures to private activities by physicians and medical staff under 
national health service contracts. One of the world’s most typical example of integrated 
public health system is given by Medicare and Medicaid programs on the one hand, and 
the private health insurance on the other hand, in the American healthcare system. On the 
European stage, the Netherlands is the country where the public authority has a strong 
presence and the private sector simultaneously plays an active role. It represents one of the 
most successful case where there is a predominantly private character of services through 
a soft rationing approach which ensures a highly regulated supply-side: in order to ensure 
the long-term financial sustainability, every time yearly health expenditure keeps growing 
for too long, minor operations and health treatments which are non acute are delayed and 
get on next year’s waiting lists. In 2014 the Dutch public health expenditure was 11,8% of 
GDP against 6,7% on average across OECD. In Southern Europe the public/private mix of 
the health care system has taken on different forms: unlike British and Scandinavian 
countries, a feature which governs the national health system in Italy and Spain is the 
sharing of  private and public resources in a «collusive» way. The national service 
 30 
 
authorizes private centers (called centri convenzionati in Italy and conciertos in Spain) to 
deliver most medical services thus sub-contracting them to private structures. Physicians 
and medical staff enjoy the freedom to do their work also on a private basis with a mix of 
services and salaries and even within the public structures (Ferrera, 1996). Furthermore, 
sub-national and regional authorities have decision-making powers: they are entitled to 
manage their own health administration at local levels. 
A change in the multi-level governance of social services has been a necessary innovation 
not only for what concerns the delivery of services but also in the procurement of new 
resources as social investment measures. Reasonable public expenditures require a strong 
role of the state in regulating and balancing social programs to ensure a sound public 
finance and, simultaneously, the involvement of different social agents from profit or non-
profit sectors to provide a variety of high-quality public services. What is the optimal 
contribution of market, individual consumer and third sector to the social economy? The 
third sector has a wider meaning: it might simultaneously refer to voluntary, non-profit 
and civil society’s bodies that are neither public nor private. It  typically includes 
associations, cooperatives, foundations, all working for a social purpose. In Italy the  
feature that prevails is the local dimension of decentralized activities to provide social 
services. The first thesis discussed by Anheier (2002) on its increasing impact across 
European countries offers, even partially, a comprehensive point of view stating that «the 
growing importance of the third sector in Europe is fuelled not only by increases in the 
demand for social services but also by basic shifts in the structure of society, in particular 
the changing role of the state, a more confident middle class and demographic factors».  
 
In Italy the shift towards a service economy is the reason behind the strong incidence of 
social cooperatives (SCs), which are playing a major role so leading to the emergence of a 
new model of mixed economy: the so called cooperative sociali are the entrepreneurial 
non-profit sector (Barbetta, 2000), spread all over the country. Type A cooperatives sell 
the service to the public administration, while type B cooperatives sell goods and services 
directly to the market by creating new job opportunities for disadvantaged individuals. 
The Italian third sector  includes many highly professional non-profit and social 
organizations which have progressively replaced the public authority, especially in 
healthcare, education and training, and services for migrant families. They are able to 
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serve the increasing demand, often in an innovative way and usually supported by 
volunteers and religious initiatives, as well as paid regular staff.  However, the South 
European countries are characterized by a poorer contribution made by volunteers in the 
total workforce employed in the sector. The SCs, whose members are also workers of the 
cooperative, managed the crisis in 2008 without any massive reduction in terms of 
productivity and creation of jobs, thus confirming the counter-cyclical performance trend 
of the third sector. A further specificity of the third sector in Italy is still the clientelistic 
connection between the public authority and the (usually local) third sector organizations.  
In Portugal the reason driving the rise of third sector institutions mainly has to do with 
their contribution to the provision of social security services at national level as part of the 
public system since 1979 (Ferreira, 2006). A good example is the network of several 
social agents who cooperate to alleviate poverty and reduce social exclusion, all 
contributing to fix social issues: public authorities (judicial authorities, education and 
health etc) and institutions (schools, polices forces, etc) on the one hand, and a range of 
third sector organizations, on the other hand. Also in Portugal there is the tendency to 
decentralize the organization of welfare by transferring to municipalities the responsibility 
of social protection. Care policies themselves are a clear example of mixed-economy 
precisely because of the simultaneous involvement of state, labour market, family and 
third sector, after the end of the golden age of welfare state. The optimal allocation of 
family care and work responsibilities depends on the bridge between public and private 
sectors over time through the combination of state-family or state-market selecting 
boundaries and conditions of care provision. The role of gender in welfare has shifted 
from a consumer dimension to a producer playing an active role in the delivery of welfare 
among the society, for example in managing social risks. All these actors face different 
social risks: families and communities are associated with reciprocity; the state play the 
function of social distribution and collective solidarity, while the market governs 
monetary interactions and competition by adjusting transfers and exchanges: an efficient 
labour market allows for more generous welfare states, which, in turn, have positive effect 
on the female employment and equality for all. How families and women produce welfare 
and deal services and income out is by partnering, child-bearing, participating in the 
labour market and by all those activities related to housework.   
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2.2 Gender equality and family policies in Southern countries 
 
Different typologies of welfare state imply different gender policy models. The  
introduction of family-work policies in almost every Western country came out of the 
growth of female labour market participation and a new model of gender division of 
family work, spreading from Scandinavian countries since the ‘60s. In one of his most 
recent book, Esping-Andersen introduces the work on the new roles for women as an 
incomplete revolution not fully supported by a change in the institutional setting resulting 
in «serious disequilibria»: on the one hand, the outdated equilibrium of the male-
breadwinner model based on a deep separation of roles, which actually still holds in 
certain societies as in the South of Italy, and, on the other hand, a new emerging dual-
income model, based on a more gender-egalitarian welfare state. The gender equality has a 
very significant impact on living standards, productivity growth and sustainable pension 
system: gaps in educational attainment, for example, negatively contribute to economic 
growth and equal access to financial instruments helps encourage women-owned business 
initiatives by involving more women in the development of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. At issue are not only gender-equity outcomes but also the provision of a great 
deal to countries with low fertility rates and outdated family models. To this end many 
indices have been used to compare and measure gender inequality and the impact on 
competitiveness and productivity growth, including the Gender-related Development 
index, the Gender Inequality Index, the Women’s Economic Opportunity and  the Global 
Gender Gap Index (GGG). The latter is an indicator, jointly designed by World Economic 
Forum, Harvard University and University of California Berkeley, that yearly provides 
comparative and intra-country information on gender-based inequalities covering 135 
countries (142 in 2014) from 2006 onwards through quantitative data and international 
statistics. The following four key areas are used to produce 14 sub-indexes on gaps in 
outcomes between men and women, regardless of the country’s development: economic 
participation and opportunity, education, political empowerment and health and survival. 
In 2014 countries at the top of the index were Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark, exactly the ones that share the same Nordic typology of welfare state. The 
Southern European countries rank far below: Spain is in 29
th
 position, Portugal is in 39
th
 
place, Italy in 69
th
 and Greece in 91
st
 out of 142 countries, almost at the bottom of the 
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ranking. Portugal went up 12 places compared with 2013 thus improving its level of 
gender equality and, although still backward, an OECD’s finding (2007, p. 14) already 
mentioned Portugal in these terms: «Gender equity objectives appear to be incidental 
rather than serve as primary policy objectives in most OECD countries, with the 
exceptions of the Nordic countries and Portugal».  Spain marked a drop of 10 places in the 
last 10 years, mostly due to a worsening of the political empowerment. Italy has slightly 
improved over the years without any glorious enhancement, whilst the level of gender 
equality index in Greece has been deteriorating over the past 3 years.  
Bozzano (2012) explores the Italian case by replicating the methodology of the Global 
Gender Gap Index to assess the geographic distribution of gender inequality across 
regions and the relationship between that and several economic variables, such as poverty 
index, fertility rate, and youth at home. The high degree of within-country heterogeneity 
has always been a peculiar issue for gender analysis and social welfare state in Italy, both 
concerning family policies implemented at national level and those designed by local 
authorities. The multidimensional index as a set of female-to-male ratios created by 
Bozzano, called Italian Gender Gap Index (IGGI), reveals a gender gap between 20% and 
30% across regions, which is mainly caused by a lag in economic and political 
empowerment. The gender gap, computed in terms of achievements and not levels, is 
wider where there has been a large fraction of young people still living with their parents 
and very large families, both strongly linked to a family-centered society, socio-cultural 
factors and inefficient labour markets. With regards to health and survival dimension, the 
best performance belongs to Valle d’Aosta, the worst to Basilicata. However, all Italian 
regions show acceptable final scores compared with the world sample average. According 
to the second dimension, i.e. education, Italy again performs well and gender gap is 
closing. In both cases, no geographical pattern has emerged. In terms of economic 
participation as third dimension, Umbria performs better than the others, while women are 
definitely underrepresented in the labour market of Sicily, Apulia, Campania and other 
Southern regions. In this respect, a geographical distribution of outcomes can be 
highlighted and, in case of last dimension of political participation, a higher level of 
heterogeneity across regions with scores still too low from being satisfactory. For sure 
there is positive correlation between smaller gender gaps and economic competitiveness, 
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then they observe a positive relation between the Italian Gender Gap Index and GDP: 
regions that have a higher productivity have also lower gender gaps.  
In order to focus attention mainly on family policies and on reconciliation of work and 
family life, the core instruments of public support to families, which, additionally, give 
mothers a help with caring tasks even from their partners, are composed of the following: 
cash benefits, leave entitlements, provision of services and taxation. The range of key 
measures and policies adopted specifically to improve the work-life balance that will be 
discussed includes i) public childcare provisions and ii) family-related leave schemes 
(parental leave, maternity and paternity leaves and leave for urgent family reasons). 
According to the definition provided by OECD in Babies and Bosses, Reconciling Work 
and Family Life (p. 14), family-friendly policies «ensure the adequacy of family resources, 
enhance child development, provide employment support for jobless parents (…) and 
include all those measures that extend both family resources –income, services and time 
for parenting- and parental labour market attachment». Besides, parental leave design is 
one of the best way to compare countries’ social policy for measuring their commitment in 
gender equality. 
 
In this regards, Naldini (2003) draws up the relationship between family and welfare state 
in a comparative analysis for two Mediterranean countries, Italy and Spain, on the ground 
of three main family models: the male-breadwinner model, the dual-earner model and the 
family/kinship solidarity model. Naldini focuses on how the main source of social 
protection and certain family laws affect the definition and evolution of family models. 
The first one describes the model of a pure occupational welfare state according to 
Ferrera’s definition, where wife and children are financially dependent on the husband’s 
income in presence of strongly separate gender roles. Therefore women, who care for 
family members and are responsible for domestic tasks, are entitled to receive several 
allowances for their status as wife and mother. The dual-earner model, mainly found in 
countries where welfare policies are provided on the basis of the principle of citizenship, 
refers to families with both men and women fully employed. Therefore dual-earner 
families are supported through public policy by receiving childcare and living 
arrangements as incentives to reconcile work and family role. However, most of these 
families follow the combination of the husband full-time work and wife long part-time 
 35 
 
work, although the increasing rate of female employment have hardly changed inequalities 
of the labour market, especially in terms of time or daily hours spent on care work. In 
doing so, Italy encourages the dual-earner family through the income tax system, while 
Spain mainly strives for a comprehensive range of public childcare services. The third 
case is the family/kinship solidarity model, in which intergenerational interactions and 
solidarity networks both within the household and between households are expected. Here 
the weight of social policy is limited because the solidarity is perceived as taken for 
granted and no specific intervention support the solidarity/kinship model. In some cases, 
however, taxpayers who care for elderly parents are entitled to enjoy tax allowances 
basically as a way of promoting intergenerational solidarity. It is probably the absence of 
targeted policies that have influenced the development of such family models or, 
conversely, «if the generally desirable model of family behaviour is one in which caring 
work is done primarily by the family (women), we would not expect to see well-developed 
social services for children and the elderly». Therefore, a state intervention is needed only 
if the family/kinship network fails to autonomously create financial and caring support. 
Does it make sense to still define a Southern family model despite changes and new goals 
for women and families over the last years? Dual-income families represent the majority 
model of OECD countries; nowadays, however, Greece, Spain and Italy are encountered 
as those few countries where single-income households are still widespread.  
 
Fig. 7: Employment patterns over couple families with children aged 0-14, 2011 
 
Source: OECD Family Database 
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Figure 7 presents the breakdown of couple families pattern of employment. It highlights 
that in Greece the one-earner model, with one parent in full-time work, applies to 41.7% 
of couple families with young child, 41.5% in Italy and 39.5% in Spain. As clearly pointed 
out in the deep red bars, the prevalence of dual-income families with both parents 
employed in full-time work covers a significant proportion in Portugal with 66%. Women 
still earn less than men, but gender pay gaps of full-time employees in these four countries 
are far below the OECD average, as shown by Figure 8. However, looking just at these 
data could be misleading. The reason why wage gaps are higher in Anglo-Saxon countries 
than South Europe is hardly due to a more equal pay treatment for women in these 
countries, but mainly in a different mechanism of employment selection (Olivetti-
Petrongolo, 2008). Thinking of the previous indicator properly integrated with female 
participation rates, then the right approach to interpret takes into account both effects on 
the final reporting: in case of Greece, for example, female participation rate is low and 
concentrated among (few) high-wage women.  
 
Fig. 8: Gender gap in average earnings of full-time employees1, 2011 or latest year 
available 
 
Source: OECD Family Database 
 
All four South European countries display some common features, as partially already 
said: a very low fertility rate, the prevalence of family solidarity values, the slow 
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emergence of changes in gender balance of family care and working life, labour market 
rigidities affecting both female employment conditions and state-families interactions and 
the still feeble range of family policies at public and institutional level. The core of these 
countries, some more than others, is the unbalanced burden of responsibilities between the 
two parents and interactions of labour market rigidities, the existing family mechanisms 
and current work-family policies: «greater gender equality in working hours is not just 
about more women in full-time employment. It is also about more men reducing their long 
hours in paid work» (www.oecd.org/gender/data). 
Following Thévenon (2011), OECD countries are located on a plane where the following 
two dimensions define different clusters of family policy patterns: the horizontal axis of 
Figure 9 represents the support enjoyed by working parents with children under 3 years 
and separates countries on the left-hand side (Scandinavian countries), characterized by a 
greater support to early childhood, from countries on the right-hand side that, conversely, 
invest more into middle and late childhood. The vertical axis measures the generosity of 
leave entitlements: countries belonging to the first quadrant on the top-left provides longer 
leaves, while countries at the bottom offer shorter leave entitlements. Moreover, the size 
of the dot marking the position of each country shows how they contribute to the family 
policy regime: bigger dots are more generous countries. However, looking at the upper-
right hand quadrant where all the Southern European countries are located, the position of 
Greece on the top-right suggests an overall poor system of family support, whatever is the 
dimension considered. The very small size of the circles representing Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, that deviate slightly from Greece on the lower left corner of the same quadrant, 
stands for a shorter period of paid leave and less extensive provision of childcare services. 
All things considered, Portugal’s family assistance works slightly better: it has a wider 
formal childcare under age 3, more fiscal advantages for dual-earner families and, as is 
clear from its female employment rate, this country contributes more substantially to 
policies for gender equality thanks to a longer period of paid paternity leave. The most 
significant difference between these ones and the Anglo-Saxon countries is the low 
amount of cash transfers: there is an overall lack of family policies, especially concerning 
paternity leave. However, such deficit is partially balanced by tax relief on the incentive to 
work: tax advantages for dual-earner households encourage the labour market 
participation by the second parent (Thévenon 2011).  
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Fig. 9: OECD countries by type of family policies  
 
Source: Thévenon 2011 
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The common socio-economic trajectories in these four countries mostly involve the search 
for a new gender balance and a changing reconciliation of family and working life, given 
the central role of family as caregiver and the male breadwinner bias. In Italy the male-
breadwinner model is still the most common family pattern in Southern Italy.  
Looking around parenting roles in Southern countries needs to see paternity at work 
during childbirth to investigate the comprehensiveness of the policy design. It is, usually, 
a very short period (among the four South European welfare states only Portugal provides 
period longer than 2 weeks) that is paid in the majority of OECD countries and helps 
assisting mother and child. However, Figure 10 gives a cross-national comparative view 
of employment-protected leave provisions for employed fathers at childbirth in 2011, 
where Italy and Greece are at the bottom of the list. Also Spain and Portugal’s length of 
paid paternity leave are above the average OECD countries. Italy and Portugal make 
paternity leave compulsory. Besides, Figure 11 shows the duration (in weeks) of paid 
paternity and maternity leave in 2011 where just Italy’s length is below the average OECD 
countries.  
 
Fig. 10: Length of paternity leave paid (2011) 
 
Source: OECD Gender Employment Database 
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Fig. 11: Total duration of paid paternity and maternity leave (2011) 
 
Source: OECD Gender Employment Database 
 
The specification above, despite being ideal, restricted and never existed in a pure form, 
allows us to highlight further differences between family models along the gender 
perspective. As previously seen on Esping-Andersen’s contribution, the serious lack of 
dealing with gender equality and unpaid work was one of the most criticized shortfalls 
thus leading to tip the balance in favour of comparative welfare regimes more centered on 
gender issues over recent years. 
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3  The OECD Social Expenditure Database 
(SOCX) 
 
Any accurate economic analysis on social and welfare issues does not avoid to consider 
the set of data collected into the OECD Social Expenditure Database. The SOCX 
Database is a comprehensive source that has been developed to provide social expenditure 
indicators of public and private social spending from 1980 onwards. It covers 34 OECD 
countries for the period 1980-2011 and estimates for 2012-2014. The most key drivers of 
increases in social spending are health and pension expenditures on average across OECD 
countries, also given the implication of an ageing population. Public spending on pensions 
increased from 5.1% of GDP in 1980 to 6.4% in 2007, while public spending on health 
increased from 4.5% of GDP in 1980 to 5.8% in 2007 (Adema et al. 2011).  
 
Table 4: Structure of the OECD-SOCX Database 
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For what concerns European countries, the latest data show that in recent years some 
countries such as Germany and UK have experienced a substantial decline in social 
spending in percent of GDP, while in many countries it is still at high levels. Public social 
spending are highest at over 30% of GDP in Denmark, Belgium, Finland and France. In 
Italy, Austria, Sweden, Germany and Spain, however, it exceeds 25% of their GDP. 
France remains the biggest social spender (Fig.12). 
 
Figure 12: Public social expenditure as a percent of GDP, 2007 and 2014 
 
Source: OECD-SOCX 
 
Precisely, social expenditure programs can be income and/or means-tested: income-tested 
benefits are available just to individual whose income is below a certain level and whose 
eligibility depends on their current income; in case of means-tested benefits the recipient’s 
entitlement depends on his/her wealth. European governments usually make a limited use 
of income-testing as a tool to transfer cash benefits to the least well-off in their social 
protection systems: based on recent OECD studies, it concerns less than 2% of GDP with 
the exception of Spain.  
Total social expenditure whose is made by two kinds of social spending: public and 
private. Private social expenditure refers to the provision of social benefits by the private 
sector to assist people in sickness, old age, unemployment etc. Total private social 
spending is much more conspicuous in the US, where it amounts to around 11% of GDP 
in 2011, than in Europe (2,6% of GDP). Such private expenditures might derive from 
mandatory or voluntary-based programmes. The latter is more extensive in countries 
where public social initiatives are limited and whose pension systems are the major 
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subject. Private pension benefits are very high in UK, the Netherlands and Denmark, at 
around 5% of GDP, while transfers to the working age population is much less relevant.  
 
3.1 OECD Family Database and the Family Support Calculator 
 
The implementation of a number of policies which aim at reconciling work and family 
care are at the basis of a country’s success in rising women employment and fertility rates. 
Those Western countries where pro-family policies are generous and successfully run are 
the same which pursue gender equality and have a high women participation to the labour 
market. As we have already seen, the historical background of a country does influence 
scopes and outcomes of public expenditure for social programmes. There are six primary 
purposes served by the family-support policies: 1) Poverty reduction and income 
maintenance; 2) Cash benefits or fiscal compensation for children’s costs; 3) Encouraging 
employment; 4) Improving gender equity; 5) Ensuring support for early childcare; 6)  
Stimulating birth rates (Thévenon, 2011). In particular, the correlation between family-
friendly policies and the female labour force participation contributes to the improvement 
of work/life balance, especially for women, which, in turn, would positively affect even 
the productivity growth and uphold a more sustainable welfare system. The impact of a 
higher female participation to the labour market does not necessarily imply a reduction of 
fertility rates, which in some cases move downward, while in some others upward.  
The OECD Family Database serves the increasing demand for cross-national indicators on 
family and children policies collecting information on four main dimensions: structure of 
families, labour market position of families, public policies for families and children, and 
child outcomes. One of the most relevant indicators under the first dimension concerns the 
public spending on family benefits (Table 4, category no. 5) which refers to the financial 
support granted exclusively to family and children well-being. Those benefits concerning 
other policy areas like health, incapacity related and housing marginally affecting family 
welfare (as in case of marriage contract) are not included. Family benefits are granted 
through financial support for tax expenditures, child-related cash transfers and provision 
of services to families with children to care for. Considering these features, the average 
amount of family benefits as percent of GDP in OECD countries is 2.6%, peaking at 4% 
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in Ireland and UK. In Italy, as in Spain, France, Norway and the Netherlands, the 
proportion of cash benefits and services is equal.  
 
Chart 1: Family public spending in cash, services and tax measures, in % of GDP, 2011 
 
Source: Social Expenditure Database 
 
France, UK and most of the Nordic countries have the highest family spending on 
childcare, where, however, significant income taxes on cash benefits transfers (except for 
Germany) and labour taxes drastically reduce de facto the net public social expenditure in 
these countries (Chart 1). On average across the OECD, the public spending on family 
benefits (in cash, services and tax breaks towards families), meaning the public support 
exclusively for families, such as child allowances, parental leave benefits and childcare 
support, increased from 1.6% of GDP  in 1980 to 2.55% of GDP in 2011 (33 countries 
accounted). Of course, the composition of the family expenditure varies across countries 
and a coherent combination of many kinds of social services is not always guaranteed. In 
2011 tax breaks for families are significant in countries like Germany and France (close to 
zero in all Scandinavian countries), while Denmark, Sweden, Norway, France and Finland 
enjoy the most generous systems of family service benefits, with a spending on average of 
2% of GDP (Table 5). In general, the implication of the above structure of spending on 
family benefits can be measured through the fact that most countries prefer the cash 
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support to families rather than childcare measures which, actually, are the effective 
promoters of the reconciliation of work and family life.  
 
Table 5: Public spending on family benefits in cash, services and tax measures, in % of 
GDP, 2011  
 
 
Source: Social Expenditure Database 
 
According to the definitions and methodology of Public Spending on Families explained 
by the OECD Family Database, the three kinds of child-related family benefits supported 
by OECD countries include the following provisions: 
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 Cash transfers, which  consist in practice of child allowances and income support 
transfers during parental leaves (sometimes also provided to single-parent families) 
 Services, which include spending on assistance for young people facilities; 
financial support by either directly financing childcare and early education 
facilities or by transfers to parents; sometimes help initiatives at home for families 
in need. 
 Family support through the tax system, for example tax exemptions, child tax 
allowances (amounts for children that are deducted from gross income and not 
included in taxable income), child tax credits.  
  
Given the specification above, the OECD Family Database makes a valuable instrument 
available to cross-country comparison on public spending on family benefits. 
The Family Support Calculator offers cross-national data on the financial support to 
family for the income year 2012: how taxes and social benefits affect the income of 
families with children to care for. For each OECD country calculations are based on birth 
related leave payments, social assistance benefits, family benefits, housing benefits and in-
work benefits and show comprehensive information on income outcomes of taxes and 
social contributions at different stages of a child’s lifecycle. This instrument allows to set 
model type families in the form of single-parent or couple-parent, different percentage of 
average wage, the number of children in the household and the age of the youngest child. 
The comparison of income situations across countries between different types of families 
and different tax and benefit systems is very useful to see how families evolves during the 
years following the birth of children. More precisely, we proceed to compare how a 
typical South European country like Italy devoting 2% of its GDP tries to satisfy the 
family needs and what is the social spending plan of countries like France (as part of the 
conservative welfare model) and Sweden (as one of the Nordic countries), both devoting a 
higher percentage of GDP (% in France and % in Sweden) to family benefits but with 
lower tax benefits system. To do this, we use the calculator for these three countries to 
specifically analyze those variables affecting the household’s situation and the lifecycle of 
children from the social benefits’ perspective. Before moving ahead, we point out a brief 
presentation of the family benefits scheme in each country. 
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Italy 
As previously seen, in 2011 Italy spent around 2% of its GDP for families with children, 
which is below the average across OECD equal to 2.55% and, although the fertility rate in 
2012 increased (1.42 in 2012, compared to 1.39 in 2011), it remains still below the OECD 
average (1.7 in 2012). In general, the Italian public intervention does not foster to combine 
raising children with professional work: many benefits and rights are entitled just to 
individual having a standard job contract thus strengthening the segmentation in the labour 
force. It would appear that the flexibility of work, achieved in recent years, is fairer to the 
companies’ interests rather than to the worker’s needs in terms of employment and quality 
of family care. ISEE = Equivalent Economic Situation Indicator (Indicatore della 
Situazione Economica Equivalente, ISEE) allows to assess the economic situation of 
families and takes account of income, assets and family composition. 
In practice, maternity allowances are granted by municipalities and are devoted to mothers 
with children aged less than 1 year, whose ISE lies below a given threshold (in case of a 
three-children household this threshold is €33.385,51). They amount to € 324,79 for five 
months and paid by the National Social Security Institute (INPS) on behalf of 
municipalities. The eligibility criteria is means-tested and the Economic Situation 
Indicator (ISE) must be lower than a given threshold. Thus beneficiaries are, usually, just 
housewives or unemployed women seeking for a job. Another scheme of maternity 
allowance is paid directly by INPS on behalf of the state and is devoted to women having 
paid contributions for at least three months before birth. Also for allowances devoted to 
households with at least 3 children younger than 18 to care for (€141,02 per month until a 
maximum duration of thirteen months) ISE must not exceed a given threshold, currently 
equal to €25.384,91. Family allowances are not devoted to self-employed and consist of 
cash transfers to employees, former-employee pensioners and unemployment benefits 
recipients. They vary with the number of family members, household typologies and 
income, used as tax base.  
The Social Card, introduced in 2009, provides €40 per month and is devoted to people 
aged more than 65 and less than 3-year-old children living on small margins (precisely, 
ISE must be lower than €15.000) to offset costs of food, health care and utility spending.  
In Italy working time flexibility does not help families to reconcile working life and 
family commitments, because only half companies provide flexi-time solutions. So the 
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best compromise is part-time jobs, to which many unpaid working hours should be added: 
the gender gap is very high compared to other OECD countries (OECD 2011). In addition, 
working parents are entitled to 11 months of parental leave, including 5 months of 
maternity leave. 
 
France 
Famous for one of the highest fertility rates in Europe, the French system of cash and in-
kind benefits helps women to keep working after being mothers. Large families are 
supported by tax reliefs: 60% of mothers with dependent child below 17 are workers. 
However, the greater the number of dependent children, the lower the percentage of 
women in paid work. In practice, families with at least two children under 20 years to care 
for are entitled to automatically receive family allowances, provided at national level, 
regardless of family resources situation but according to the number of family children. 
The higher the number, the more generous the additional allowances. The family support 
allowance is a bit different because it provides an assistance to raise children if one or 
both parents does not provide any support: rates amount to €90,40 per child when only 
one person is involved in his care, and €120,54 per child when someone is raising a child 
without any support from his parents. In fact, after the third child they are entitled to enjoy 
further family support equal to €167,34, subject to means-testing. Another monthly 
scheme provided at national level is the flat-rate childcare benefit for child up to 3 years to 
parents of at least two children in order to support early education expenses. Maternal 
leave provides the full coverage of 16 weeks, whilst paternity leave ensures to fathers the 
full payment of wage for 11 consecutive days and is extended to all families. Family 
housing benefits can be granted to all households depending on their income, rent and 
family type: it increases with the arrival of children. Conversely, the premium of birth is 
one-shot and amount to €923,08. 
Most of French schemes are means-tested. The early-child benefit program includes a 
birth (or adoption) grant, a maintenance benefit, supplements for free choice of working 
time and of childcare. To be entitled to the birth grant, the income ceilings effective in 
2013 are the following: 
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Children at home 
 (born or expected) 
Couple with one income Single parent or couple with 
two incomes 
1 34 819 € 46 014€ 
2 41 783 € 52 978 € 
3 50 140 € 61 335 € 
Additional child 8 357 € 8 357 € 
Source: Caisse d’Allocation Familiale (CAF) 
 
The maintenance benefit, whose basic amount is €184,62 per month, provides a financial 
support for raising children up to 3 years and according to the same ceilings above. To be 
eligible to the supplement for free choice of childcare (called CMG), children must be less 
than 6 years old. The back-to-school allowance, still subject to specific income ceilings, 
offers a great support for the schooling costs for children aged 6 to 18, from a minimum 
amount of €360,47 to a maximum of €393,54. 
 
Sweden 
Swedish public childcare is one of the OECD’s most generous and efficient because 
provide a wide range of family policies to most household candidates without strict 
eligibility criteria. At around 3.60% of GDP the Swedish family policy is one of the most 
successful example of how families should be supported in terms of mothers’ working life 
and family care. Here the male-breadwinner model gave way to a modern individual 
model since the late 1960s, by creating policies devoted to male and female workers 
equally, thus strongly reducing the influence of the breadwinner male. It is a point of 
reference for dual-earner models of family policy, which has been reasonably valuable 
over the years thanks to the well-being of both parents and children where the formers are 
both fostered to participate in the labour market.  
As is in France, family benefits in Sweden are less structured than in Italy: they consist of 
a child benefit monthly paid to each child below 16 (or 20 if still student). No further 
conditions are required to be beneficiaries. The annual amount of benefit is SEK 12.600 
per child, with further supplements as higher the number of children. The family benefits 
are nor taxable, neither subject to any means test. The country has a flexible parental leave 
scheme, up to 16 months per child, partly reserved  exclusively to fathers (the so-called 
“daddy quota”). In 2007 a tax deduction for household services of 50% was introduced to 
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help families with both parents in paid work to enjoy even baby-sitting service. In 2008 
the gender equality bonus and a flat-rate home care allowance were introduced. The first is 
designed to encourage an equal sharing of parental leave, so an equal sharing of childcare 
with more incentives to mothers’ participation in labour market: if the leave is equally 
shared between parents, then the bonus is maximum (SEK 13.500 per child). The latter, 
granted by municipalities, is an untaxed benefit of SEK 3.000 per month, devoted to those 
parents who prefer to stay home for a longer time and postpone the back to work, without 
any previous work requirement.  
Pre-school is totally free for children aged between 3 and 6 for up to 15 hours per week. 
Furthermore, a child-raising allowance is spent to cover the transition time between 
parental leave and returning to work, but in this case eligibility conditions are higher than 
other social security benefits: it is not compatible with parenthood,  unemployment and 
sickness benefits and only in case the child is not enrolled in public childcare.  
 
Given an overview of the entitlements for each country, the three systems of family 
policies and childcare differ greatly from one another and how families cope with the 
birth, growth and education of children varies widely. Although this framework shows 
Italy in a bad light and is overly simplistic, it is true that families in France and Sweden 
have to face a heavier taxation burden. Tables 6-7-8 show how the income situation of a 
dual-earner family changes in Italy, France and Sweden, as the age of children and their 
income change. More precisely, the assumptions to obtain the output are the following: 
 one adult earns 100% of the average wage income and the second parent earns 
50% of the average age; 
 the household is made up of 3 children; the youngest is 2 months old.  
The reference year for tax–benefit system is 2012. We are assuming the same family 
settings for all countries and, since both parents work, the total family income is the sum 
of the two. Given the age of the youngest child during which women enjoy the maternity 
leave and that men are the main earner of the couple-parent household, income generally 
received by the spouse is out of the total household income base as being part of the birth-
related benefits. Without going into the nature of the tax unit to avoid discussions on the 
gender-based taxation and the higher labour supply elasticity of women, the disposable 
family income is as follows. 
 51 
 
Table 6: Income situation of a couple-parent household in Italy in 2012  
 
Source: OECD Family Database 
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Table 7: Income situation of a couple-parent household in France in 2012  
 
Source: OECD Family Database 
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Table 8: Income situation of a couple-parent household in Sweden in 2012  
 
Source: OECD Family Database 
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For each country the pattern of the net income is weighted by the involved components, 
highlighted in different colours, which shape the composition of the disposable household  
income. The weight of family benefits (in darker green), spread proportionally, is minimal 
in Italy and highest in Sweden, whilst the social contributions (in orange) are larger in 
France than Sweden and Italy. As expected, also the income tax is higher in Sweden, 
where we find also the in-work benefits (the thin block over the family benefits): in-work 
family programmes are an effective measure increasing the financial return to working. 
When they are sufficiently large according to the income level, they can potentially 
influence the employment rate and the transition to higher paid work. Family benefits 
represent 1.6% of the net income in Italy, 5.8% in France and 9.7% in Sweden. Maternity 
leave payment is 80% of the annual income received by the woman, 81% in France and 
77% in Sweden. In Sweden the overall impact of the tax-benefit structure on the net 
income and on family well-being is highly dependent on the benefit-side of the system, 
while in Italy taxation and maternity payments play a greater role and matter a bit more.  
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3.2   A further source of data: MISSOC Database 
 
In order to find regularly updated data on the welfare state in Italy, the EU's Mutual 
Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) provides a set of detailed information 
and comparative tables on social protection systems of 32 countries. It is a European 
initiative and data refer to 12 different areas of social protection: financing, healthcare, 
sickness, maternity, invalidity, old-age, survivors, employment injuries and occupational 
diseases, family, unemployment, guaranteed minimum resources and long-term care. It 
results from the cooperation between the European Commission and the representatives of 
national institutions which are responsible for social protection. This source of 
information provides a) country-specific descriptions of the administrative organisation of 
social protection, updated twice a year; b) comparative tables for horizontal analysis to 
introduce each country and put them into the appropriate system; c) MISSOC reports 
focused on developments of the field of social protection with an yearly overview on 
major trends. 
Data in Tables 9-10-11, still looking at the same countries seen above, offer a detailed 
description of French, Italian and Swedish family policies, included in two MISSOC 
comparative tables, i.e. Maternity/Paternity and Family benefits, which have been updated 
on January 2014. This information allowed to give an institutional and theoretical 
explanation of data from OECD-SOCX Database in a cross-country comparative 
approach. With regards to Maternity/Paternity, the conditions of entitlement vary across 
them and can concern benefits-in-kind (healthcare related to pregnancy and childbirth), 
cash-benefits (maternity, paternity maternity, paternity and adoption benefits) and 
employment protection (leave with the right to re-engagement, which is, however, outside 
the scope of MISSOC). In these countries, benefits are generally paid also when a child is 
adopted. In France and Sweden entitlement is established simply on the basis of residence, 
while in Italy family allowances may be paid to people residing in another country, 
provided that they have concluded a social security agreement with Italy. With regards to 
Family Benefits, the family support system is one of the major tools to increase the quality 
of family life through a range of incentives promoting childbirth and encouraging parents 
to spend more time for children, given constant changes in gender and family priorities. 
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The provision of family support comprises four main sections of state support for families 
with young children:   
 direct and indirect subsidies for parents (family allowances, childcare 
benefits, vouchers, tax benefits and deductions); 
 early childhood care and education services through public institutions (nurseries, 
crèches, pre-schools and kindergartens); 
 parental leave policies (maternity, paternity, parental and child-raising 
leave); 
 direct and indirect subsidies for some special categories such as unemployed 
persons, pensioners, orphans (MISSOC, 2014).  
 
Tables 9-10-11 show the different child-raising, childcare allowances and family benefits 
(special cases, concerning other MISSOC categories like unemployment and disability, 
are neglected) in terms of entitlement conditions and amount paid-out to beneficiaries. 
Child benefits and family allowance are both ways adopted to encourage the best balance 
between working life and family responsibilities, either to not give up working or to take 
time from work (leave policies). Even if they are all defined as universal programmes, 
most of targeting policies are actually income-tested benefits or in-between the two. 
Precisely, the amount may be age-related, income-related or equal for all families (flat-
rate): a country’s mix of benefits significantly produces effects in terms of fertility, female 
labour participation and family well-being. According to several factors which differ 
largely from one case to another, the design of family policies is country-specific. 
France has the most generous system of family policies: the social security system pays 
family benefits to people with dependent children, all residing in France, even they do not 
work. The age limit (20 years old) is higher than in Italy (18 years old) and Sweden (18 
years old) and one of its strengths is the high-quality early childhood education. Since 
1913 French families enjoy the paid maternity leave, based on a universal scheme for 
households with at least two dependent children aiming to avoid any income-based 
distortions in the eligibility criteria. Furthermore over the last years, despite the slow 
economic growth, France has slightly cut health and pension expenditures in order to 
strengthen the provision of family benefits thus upholding one of the highest fertility rate 
across European countries. Looking specifically at France in Table 10 what is interesting 
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is that there is no variation of monthly benefit amount with income because the family 
support allowance is not means-tested, but rather it depends just on the age of children. 
Also the additional monthly flat-rate allowance is paid out to families with at least three 
children with one turned 20 years, no matter what is the total income earned by the 
household in case. In fact, redistribution of family welfare policies through taxes and 
benefits can be horizontal or vertical: it is horizontal when benefits vary across the family 
components and dependent children; conversely, the allocation of benefits follows a 
vertical approach when it depends on family income situation. Thus, the main way to 
adjust benefits to redistribute welfare is means-testing. Although French family policy has 
always favoured the horizontal one, recently there is a shift toward an increasing means-
tested allowance benefits. Still in France, for example, the family income supplement is a 
means-tested benefit for at least three children aged between 3 and 21 years, which 
submits given thresholds based on the household net income. Also the Birth or Adoption 
Grant for the Infant Welcome Benefit (Table 11) covering the expenses related to the 
birth (or adoption) of child and the family housing allowance as support for housing costs 
are subject to means test.  
The strength of the social policy that makes Sweden family-friendly concerns the very 
long parental leave and the Gender Equality bonus (Table 11), introduced in 2008 at 
national level, to reduce the gender wage gap and improve the well-being of families. 
Parents are entitled to 480 days of paid parental leave when a child is born or is adopted: 
for 390 days they received 80% of their pay, whilst for the remaining 90 days a flat-pay. 
The gender equality bonus represents a great incentive for women to get back to work 
after childbirth by sharing the parental leave as evenly as possible: it is an extra daily 
payment provided that 270 days of the paid parental leave are shared equally between 
parents. The bonus (tax credits) is given to parents only if both use more than their 
reserved months. In fact, fathers and mothers are both entitled to 240 of the 480 paid 
parental leave days and, since 2002, each parent has two reserved months for himself or 
herself, which, otherwise, are lost because the reserved time cannot be transferred to the 
other. In this respect, however, the effects of these programmes in terms of division of 
parental leave have been measured and there is no statistically significant variation in the 
proportion of fathers using parental leave days after the implementation of the gender 
equality bonus (Duvander and Johansson, 2010). The comparative analysis, carried out 
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through a logit model, focuses on short-term outcomes: the introduction of reserved 
months produced an increase in mothers’ and fathers’ use of leave days within the first 12 
months after birth, while the gender equality bonus did not shift any average amount of 
leave days from mothers to fathers. Nonetheless, both programmes improve the social 
value of children and working parents, by promoting the gender equal parenthood, 
although the impact of the reserved months on the parental leave pattern was clearly 
stronger than the impact of the gender bonus. 
In Italy, unlike France, the amount of family benefits are nearly always based on the 
annual household income in direct proportions to the number of children, with no 
variation with age (Table 10). Both maternity allowance and social card are granted by 
means of ISE. Most of children aged three-to-five years old are enrolled in scuola 
materna, which is the pre-primary school known as a cornerstone for childhood education 
in Italy. There are not many social initiatives to face the work-life conflict: the main 
public support for work-life relationship are maternal and parental benefits together with 
childcare benefits, whilst family and child allowances mainly alleviate poverty and work 
directly on the income level of families. By the comparison between Italy, a conservative 
welfare and a Scandinavian one, the only mainstay of the Italian family benefits system, 
which is slightly heterogeneous across regions, is the tax treatment of the family, whose 
tax deductions are, however, less generous than in France. Moreover, the allocation of 
resources is distortive and produces a non-effective redistributive impact. It is desirable to 
take a closer interaction between tax relief, family allowances and the strengthening of 
paternal leave policies, which are currently minimal. 
In conclusion, Sweden has more working mothers than France and Italy: in 2013 the 
female employment/population ratio (ages 15 to 64) was 72.5% in Sweden, 60.4% in 
France and 47.2% in Italy. The Scandinavian countries were the first to introduce and 
keep improve a modern public system of childcare and family policy development that 
ensured a high degree of compatibility between paid work and having children since 
years. As the tables below make clear, the absence of tax deductions in Sweden, and 
mostly in France too, is more than compensated by the quality of services provided, by the 
equity in access and by the perfect realization of every measure to realize the dual-income 
model of family. Conversely, Italy, as are Greece and Spain, still rests on fiscal relief and 
an obsolete set of incentives.  
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Table 9: Child benefits in France, Italy and Sweden (last update: Jan 2014) 
 
 
Source: MISSOC Database 
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Table 10: Child raising and child care allowances in France, Italy and Sweden  (updated 
on Jan 2014) 
 
Source: MISSOC Database 
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Table 11: Other family benefits in France, Italy and Sweden  (updated on Jan 2014) 
 
Source: MISSOC Database 
 
Although tax relief is a very convenient way of creating incentives, countries should 
breathe life into the implementation of more active strategies to get out of the trap of 
male-breadwinner model: in order to increase the female participation to the labour 
market, for instance, a number of targeted policies has to be able to rethink the role of men 
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in family life. The Southern countries, in which also the fertility rate is symptomatic of a 
not very efficient work and family reconciliation system, suffer the maternal role 
incompatibility: women tend to have only one child whether they are worker or not, while 
in Spain they are at crossroads as soon as they become mother for the first time. It is true 
that the Nordic long tradition approach to family models is hard to implement in larger 
countries, where tax rates are lower, local authorities unable to deliver better-quality 
services and a hard sustainability of such comprehensive system of family-friendly 
workplace practices. 
Just having a look at Fig.13, it is one more proof that the Southern countries are even 
below the Central Eastern welfare states in workplace practices: they are little strategies to 
match family and work commitments, especially for parents who do not have access to the 
public family policies. Firms introduce these practices on working schedule in order to 
increase flexibility: working from home and flexitime in Italy (as is in Portugal) are very 
rare.  
Figure 13: Family-friendly workplace practices, 2009 
 
Source: OECD Family Database 
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 “È un ammasso di frammenti spesso incoerenti il nostro sistema di welfare.  
Sostegno ai più poveri, al costo dei figli, conciliazione lavoro-famiglia:  
salvo che per la sanità, pressoché tutte le politiche sociali  
sono per chi ha un lavoro e appartiene a una  
categoria, anziché essere dirette  
ai cittadini in quanto tali” 
[LaVoce.Info, 2014] 
 
4  The Italian case: welfare system and impact of family policies 
 
4.1    The Italian welfare system 
 
Trying to define the Italian welfare state means dealing with a mixed model which adopts 
elements most likely from two previously discussed regimes: the conservative-corporatist 
regime and the Southern one.  
Table 12. Aggregate Social Expenditure in percentage of GDP, 2013 
France 33,0
Denmark 30,8
Belgium 30,7
Finland 30,5
Sweden 28,6
Italy 28,4
Austria 28,3
Spain 27,4
Portugal 26,4
Germany 26,2
Netherlands 24,3
Slovenia 23,8
United Kingdom 23,8
Norway 22,9
Greece 22,0
Czech Republic 21,8
Ireland 21,6
Hungary 21,6
Poland 20,9
Slovak Republic 17,9
Estonia 17,7
Iceland 17,2  
Source: OECD SOCX  
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As has been previously mentioned, according to the key literature on the conception and 
categorization of the social protection regimes, the Italian welfare system is placed by 
Esping-Andersen into the category of the conservative regime which was characterized, 
among others, by the strong presence of the Catholic Church that in some way influenced 
the social policy patterns and familial provision of care services. Indeed, in his The Three 
Worlds Of Welfare Capitalism, he overlapped the conservative-corporatist regime with the 
Christian democratic one because of the same high level of decommodification, high 
fragmentation of social insurance and social stratification. While the social democrat ic 
form of decommodification attaches social rights to individuals as citizens, the Christian 
democratic form associates social rights to social units, particularly the family unit. And 
while welfare policies in Germany, Austria and France were influenced by the monarchy, 
the Italian case was instead inspired by the social principles of the Church. Here too, it has 
to be pointed out that the Christian democratic welfare state should be regarded as a 
special case of the conservative-corporatist regime towards the goal of identifying the 
most important roots of the social protection scheme, which are both featured by the 
following same hallmarks: «occupational social insurance programs that reproduce status 
differentials; few publicly provided services, particularly for families; a male-breadwinner 
bias in both tax and transfer systems; a tendency to devolve authority over delivery and 
implementation of social policy to non-state actors» (Lynch,2004) . 
In this regard, in her “Italy: A Christian Democratic Welfare State?” Julia Lynch attempts 
to explain how significant was the influence of the Christian Democratic party in Italy 
(known as Democrazia Cristiana) on the development of the welfare structure seeking to 
refute Esping-Andersen’s (1990) basic position.  
 
Can key features of the welfare state in Italy be attributed to the dominance of the 
Catholic Church and social Catholic ideologies in Italian political life? [...] Italy is not a 
true Christian Democratic Welfare State (CDWS). It looks Christian democratic, both 
because of its proximity to the Vatican and because of the DC's hegemonic position 
since World War II, but it is not the result of Christian democratic politics. [...] The 
fragmented occupational nature of the public pension system is not an outgrowth of 
organicist social Catholic doctrines. Rather, it results from the DC's clientelistic 
extension of an occupational pension system established on monarchical etatist 
principles. Neither can the familialism of a welfare state dominated by pension 
spending be attributed to Catholic subsidiarity doctrine. Instead, we need to look to 
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long-term processes of welfare state change and non-change to explain why the Italian 
welfare state directs most of its resources to ageing patriarchs. 
 
In this respect, Lynch insists on the distinction between the set of social Catholic 
values so prevalent around the country, which certainly influenced the path toward 
the definition of the welfare system, and the Christian democratic party’s clientelism 
which was the decisive element guiding the public policy development in Italy. In 
fact, just to exceed the threshold of the merely cosmetic history, it must be 
recognised that the social protection issue was a DC’s great source of exercising 
power at its disposal in order to gain the public endorsement. More than that, their 
decisions on public spending would come to build up a closed network of client-
based statesmen whose political approach helped make the public investments an 
attractive source of political consensus.  
Here too, the primary reference author it is worth taking note of is Maurizio Ferrera, 
whose studies on the Southern welfare model have ended to a systematic analysis on 
Italy’s social protection framework. In order to go further on the subject above-
mentioned, we have already discussed his position about the distinction between the 
Mediterranean welfare regime and the conservative-corporatist one (Ferrera, 1996). 
So what should now be pointed out is the «double distortion» of the Italian welfare 
state (Ferrera, Fargion and Jessoula, 2012), both in functional and distributive terms: 
the first dimension refers to a pension-heavy welfare system, which implies a peak 
of generosity in favour of pensioners long enjoying a high social protection – 
particularly the public functionaries – while the latter refers to a strong focusing of 
welfare interventions, particularly by transfers, in favour of the insiders of the labour 
market.  
As clearly shown in Figure 14, the behaviour of social protection expenditure in 
Italy has a similar profile to that of social expenditure in the EU-15.  
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Figure 14. Evolution of social protection expenditure as % of GDP: Italy 2001-2012 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
Fig. 15 provides a simple predictions of one of the most persistent issue of the 
Italian welfare state, represented by the branch of old-age social expenditure. The 
very steep increase from 2008 onwards, rising year by year (the public spending 
between 2008 to 2010 rose by more than 1% of GDP) is probably due to the effects 
of the ongoing financial crisis, which is heavily hitting Italy and has induced to a 
downward revision of GDP growth forecasts.   
 
Figure 15. Pensions expenditure in Italy as % of GDP, 2001-2011 
 
Source: ISTAT 
 
In 2012 the highest incidence of the expense in pensions on GDP at regional level 
was 21.83% in Calabria and the lowest was 11.34% in the autonomous province of 
Bolzano; the overall highest in Europe, followed by France and Austria. This frame 
of reference suggests the presence of certain peculiarities which allows to argue that 
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some Italian welfare state’s main features - that are listed in more detail from next 
paragraph on - are certainly common to other Southern countries, but not to all of 
them. The comparative analysis of the pension system of SE countries reveals that 
both Italy and Spain have to deal with a highly dualistic labour market, with a strong 
insiders-outsiders trade-off and, particularly for the latter, heavy old rigidities still 
far from a flexicurity concept. In fact, flexicurity is aimed at creating more and better 
jobs by keeping the flexibility and, simultaneously, increasing the social protection 
system. For that reason, naming them anomalies rather than peculiarities would be 
more appropriate just because of such mixed nature of traditional welfare clusters.  
Another notable matter to think about is offered by Rodger’s work on the distinction 
between «welfare state» and «welfare society»: in his From a Welfare State To a 
Welfare Society he states that there has been a changeover from a ‘welfare state’ 
mode, which is used to guarantee goods and services to citizens through legal 
entitlements, to a ‘welfare society’ setting where the same goods and services are 
provided by the private sector. While the former still holds within Scandinavian and 
continental European countries and is based on the vertical principle of subsidiarity 
(Art.118 of the Italian Constitution) where the welfare actors are the national 
government and its local authorities, the welfare society is based on the principle of 
horizontal subsidiarity that is proper of a mixed economy of welfare, where the 
participation of the third sector (i.e. private sector) plays a substantial role in social 
benefits provision. Again, the origins of subsidiarity come from the ecclesiastic 
doctrine (Rerum Novarum, 1931) asking citizens to provide welfare services as both 
individuals and associations just leaving the public authorities the planning and 
coordinating functions.  
In the light of these considerations, the major characteristics of the Italian welfare 
system, which belong to several different frameworks as introduced in the previous 
benchmarks, follow in details below.  
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4.2  Highly dualistic labour market  
 
As has been said, the economic crisis has severely hit Italian precarious workers, 
more than half are highly skilled young people below 35 years of age. There are 
some specific groups of workers classically affected by precarious employment: 
young people, low-skilled, immigrants, women. However, even if this work does not 
aim to focus specifically on youth generations, in Italy the dual labour market is 
strongly linked to the age. Del Boca and Rota in their “Entry and Exit Flexibility: 
Asymmetries in the Italian labour market” (2008) provides a useful explanation of 
the link between precarity and temporary employment: 
 
The so called «precarietà» is a term which defines the status of a typically, but not 
inevitably, young person who finds himself/herself in a long sequence of temporary 
contracts, and therefore the protection afforded to permanent employees, and who 
generally has a low wage. One consequence is that temporary workers find it more 
difficult to obtain loans for car purchase or residential mortgages. 
 
In fact, the dualism of the Italian labour market is a sharp segmentation into two 
main submarkets (a third one could be identified as a large black market economy, 
which though will be here disregarded): on the one hand, permanent workers located 
in the primary sector who are over-protected against unfair dismissals and employed 
under secure contracts; on the other hand, workers located in the secondary non-
institutional sector, mostly young people just entering the working age, who are 
under-protected and exposed to risks connected to the absence of an adequate 
unemployment assistance or minimum income scheme, that is currently lacking as is 
the case of Germany, Austria, Denmark, Cyprus, Finland and Sweden. The outsiders 
are typically employed under atypical contracts with few training opportunities and 
little job security: temporary work (fixed-term, apprenticeships, seasonal) and quasi-
dependent work (collaborations and occasional work), which have been addressed in 
the Jobs Act, a new programme for Labour Reforms produced by the Renzi 
government since the beginning of 2014.   
The labour market was previously reformed in 2012 (Riforma Fornero, Law No. 
92/2012) in an attempt to alleviate precarity through a higher employment protection 
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for those who are under flexible contracts, while reducing the protection for 
permanent workers and promoting the apprenticeship contract for young 
newcomers. The Fornero reform aimed at ensuring the welfare of the youngest 
generations by reducing the inequalities in the employment protection between 
insiders and outsiders while reaching, at the same time, an appropriate degree of 
both entry and exit flexibility, where the Italian labour market is most lacking. In 
trying to balance the legal protection between standard and non-standard workers 
and to reduce the asymmetries of the Italian labour market, given by the restrictive 
firing regulations, it inevitably dealt with the unemployment benefits system: it 
replaced the previous Mobility allowance with the new Assicurazione Sociale per 
l’Impiego (ASpI), a new social insurance introducing a wider coverage in terms of 
eligibility but for shorter periods of time than the previous scheme, and limited the 
use of Wage Guarantee Fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) only to cases of 
temporary reduction in working time due to changes in business cycle or corporate 
restructuring. Furthermore, it gave close attention to the apprenticeship contract as 
the main mean of access to labour market for a minimum period of 6 months – that, 
however, can be reduced in case of seasonal activities –  and ensuring generous 
social security discount, given that companies with more than 10 employees could 
hire apprentices in a ratio of 3 for every 2 skilled employees, while for companies 
with fewer than 10 employees the ratio is 1:1.  
 
It is hard to evaluate which was the impact of the Monti-Fornero reform on the 
Italian labour market. What could be interesting to draw is about the apprenticeship 
contract: even if the reform was supposed to stimulate an intensive use of such 
contract as a sound compromise between training for the employee and tax break for 
the employer, it is interesting to notice that work agreements in the form of 
apprenticeship were most widely-used before its entry into force as in the first half 
of 2011 (133.946) than after, as in the first half of 2013 (107.717).  
In a system as it stands today, with U-shaped wage settings – falling at the entry and 
increasing in age – and permanent jobs so overprotected, negative labour market 
shocks would shift the burden on the youngest workers with a clearly unbalanced 
effect on insiders and outsiders. However, its attempt to increase the flexibility 
without this affecting security, not easy to grasp, appears to have involved just the 
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hiring side: given that costs for an employer to fire an employee on a permanent 
contract remains high and that dismissals take longer time than expected, an 
employer has no incentive to offer jobs on open-ended contracts. So the turnover of 
temporary workers with fixed-term contracts remains very high.  
 
In Berloffa-Villa (2007) the econometric analysis carried out to measure differences 
between young cohorts and older cohorts of household earning an equivalent level 
of income over the last fifteen years reveals a deterioration in terms of economic 
conditions and future prospects for young cohorts. The analysis takes into account 
labour market conditions, the household size, changes in the social security system 
and the housing costs. The worse performance of labour income as for young 
cohorts explains their difficulties in planning the foundation of a family and buying 
their own house. The lack of good conditions for foster families in terms of wage 
loss is large enough to exceed the lower housing size trend, so that the household 
equivalent labour income resulted from their work is about 10% lower for younger 
cohorts. The analysis shows the experience of households headed by different kinds 
of working profile: on the one hand, white and blue collar households have suffered 
worst economic conditions; on the other hand, managers, self-employed and retired 
agents have enjoyed better economic situation. In addition, all these conclusions are 
strictly related to another social feature previously seen and later discussed, the de-
familization degree, because it highlights the impact of the rising prices in the 
housing market against a stagnation in the disposable income by estimating the 
effects of household size and the number of income earners.  
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Gender wage gap and effects on female employment   
 
Exploring any possible correlation between gender differences in access to the 
labour market and in wage inequality gets a more comprehensive view on how 
Italian families handle the trade-off between working time and family care 
responsibilities. The gender wage gap (in unadjusted form) provided by Eurostat 
Database is defined as the % difference between average gross hourly earnings of 
male and female employees, as % of male gross earnings divided by the male 
median wages. Data refer to full-time employees and cover an interval ranging from  
2000 to 2013, available on a yearly-basis. In 2012, GPG in Italy is about 6.7% 
against 16.4% on average European countries where, in practice, women should 
work 2 months more than men in order to equal their wages. Considering enterprises 
with at least 10 employees, the GPG for people aged 25-34 years is higher (8.6%) 
than the other age groups (very low for women aged 45-54 years at 4.8%). Why is 
the Italian GPG so low? Data as they are can be misleading and should be read in 
the light of the high female unemployment rates, especially in those highly skilled 
sectors where the highest pay differences occur, unlike, for instance, manufacturing. 
Wages for women workers is close to wage level for men, but the number of women 
entering the labour market is far shorter than most European countries. 
Comparing GPG and female employment rate through the line graphs below might 
be interesting: is there any correlation between the female employment trend over 
time (measured in percentage) and the gender wage inequality? The evolution in 
gender wage gap reflects the change in gender education gap because gaining both 
education and work experience influences the level of earnings thus holding the 
wage down in case of lower education and low skilled women. Whilst the gender 
wage gap shown in Fig.16 does exhibit a trend from 2000 onwards in common with 
the employment rate for women aged 15-64 (Fig.17) throughout the period at issue. 
However, the attempt to formally describe a significant correlation between these 
data is made in the coming chapter through Gretl statistics. Here the debate on 
whether flexible employment contracts would encourage or rather trap the female 
participation to the labour market is neglected. For sure, an explanation of the wage 
gap suffered by women employed is that men and women have different preferences 
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towards working conditions (Mussida and Picchio, 2011): in a male-breadwinner 
tradition as is the case in Italy women might be more interesting in a more flexible 
job contract (part-time, for example) rather than a higher wage. They would be less 
career-oriented than men due to an easier way to reconcile work and family 
commitments by enjoying unstable or low paid job: the increase in the atypical work 
for women leads to an increase of the labour force participation rate thus beginning 
to be featured in the wage distribution. This, in turn, increases the gender wage gap 
over time. So the overall wage distribution have a significant impact on the gender 
differentials.   
 
Figure 16. Gender pay gap in Italy, 2000-2010 
 
Source: OECD  
 
Figure 17. Female employment rate (in percentage) aged 15-64 in Italy, 2000 
onwards 
 
Source: OECD Short-Term Labour Market Statistics 
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4.3  A pension-heavy welfare state 
 
Even though it was long time since Ferrera’s analysis of the southern road towards 
welfare and the “soft state” of Italy, the trait of heavy pension scheme he highlighted 
several times seems to still hold. Looking at the evolution over the last 30 years of 
public social expenditure on old age in Italy (Table 13), variation in terms of GDP 
percentage between 1980 and 2011 was almost twice the average OECD. There was 
an ever increasing change in the share of Italy’s government spending on pensions, 
resulting in an excess of public social expenditure without a full efficient coverage 
to match. And, as previously seen, the way Italy distributes welfare on pension 
focuses far more greatly on cash transfers than on services. 
 
Table 13: Public expenditure on old age and survivors’ benefits 
Change
1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1980-2011
Italy 7.2 9.5 11,3 10.8 11.6 13.3 86.1%
OECD 5.1 5.9 6.5 6.4 6.5 7.3 45,0%
Level (% of GDP)
Public social expenditure on old-age
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of OECD-SOCX data 
 
In 2013, the incidence of pension expenditure on public spending was about 17% on 
average OECD countries, varying from 3% in Iceland to 30% in Italy.  
The so-called Fornero Pension Reform, which came into force during the Monti 
government in 2012, introduced the raising of the retirement age for both sexes and 
a gradual increase of age and contribution-based requirements followed by many 
reforms aimed at fiscal consolidation programmes. More specifically, between 2009 
and 2013 pension age for women increased from age 60 to age 66 in order to reach 
the same pension age of men by 2018, whilst pension age for women employed in 
the public sector rose from 60 to 65 in 2012 (OECD, 2013, p. 35). In general, the 
implications of an aging population (Table 14), resulted by the increasing longevity 
and the decline of fertility, has led to draw up a link between increases in pension 
ages and variations in life expectancy. Some specific sanctions are carried in case of 
retirement before the minimum age and other eligibility criteria. All the South 
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European countries are characterised by relatively low levels of social provision and 
a public pension system playing a more decisive role than private pension plans that 
cover just 13.3% of working age population.  
 
Table 14: Top 20 countries for population ages 65 and above (% of total) in 2013 
 
Source:Worldbank 
.  
Table 15: (Mean) gender wealth gap among the over-65s 
 
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance 2013 
 
Looking at the link between gender gap and pensions, it is plausible to assume that 
shorter careers of women over the past years with respect to men imply higher 
 75 
 
gender gaps which is slightly lower in the public sector. Table 15 shows the gender 
wealth gap in old age that amounts 46% on average: Italy is very close to it at 44%, 
while rates of Spain and Greece are worse off. It is interesting to consider an 
alternative indicator of gender inequality as the one provided by the concept of 
wealth, that, actually, is wider than the flow variable of income. Since wealth 
accounts for the total set of resources in a household, measurements of wealth are 
much more appropriate in case of specific life-cycle stages as for people aged over 
65. The gender gap in pension (GGP) in Italy, which measures gender disparities in 
pensions catching unequal income during people’s lifecycle, is around 30%, which, 
however, remains below the EU average (39%). Since this indicator is based on the 
individual financial returns from women and men working paths, then the gender 
gap in pension coverage, of course, reflects the gender gap in wages: women are less 
likely to receive a pension than men. This is one of the most plausible hypothesis 
involving the strict influence between women’s low and uneven participation to 
formal labour market in the past and pension entitlement. Every social policy is 
related and has its part to play: the lack of an adequate family policies system (paid 
leave maternity, care of a newborn, child allowances etc) during the past decades 
induced many women to give up their career and other paid labour positions. 
Besides, in order to remain focused on family conditions and women  support 
related now to an old-age female population, the effect of marital and family status 
of women can be taken as yet more proof that the gender gap in pensions is higher 
for married women: in 2012 the gender gap in pensions by marital status, provided 
by , amounts 46.7% for married women and 27.5% for single women. Therefore, 
married women suffer a widest gap as certainly most European countries (European 
Commission). 
As one of the most sweeping issue of welfare system, the pension-heavy dimension, 
which has been reduced since several reforms in the 90s, is not just the unbalanced 
mobilisation of resources on it at the expense of other welfare branches such as 
unemployment, education (clearly evident from PISA tables on educational 
achievement) and social assistance, but also a matter of fragmentation and public 
financial sustainability due to its PAYG pension scheme.  
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4.4  Housing and low level of de-familization  
 
Families are the core of this economy, closely involved in the intergenerational 
redistribution of resources –in cash, in kind and in time- among individuals and 
households. The defamilization degree deals with the three welfare system’s players 
affecting each other in a close relationship: the state, the market and the family unit. 
As briefly outlined in Chapter 1, low defamilization means a solid and stable 
dependency of an individual to his or her parental support and family life, whatever 
is the market performance. With reference to the Italian case, it requires the ability 
to weaken the worker’s autonomy and the intergenerational dependency which aims 
to reduce the influence of the family structures on the country’s employment pattern. 
The government is its main responsible, because implementing new social policies 
to defamilize welfare would encourage more young women to enter the labour 
market, young adults to build up their independence and new cultural values about 
motherhood and parents’ attitude. Even more so, the economic recession has 
brought an ever growing risk to see enhanced such intergenerational dependencies 
which usually show up by pooling the resources to protect family members from 
being poor.  
The tendency to play as much as possible the role of public authority by the family 
network to provide welfare services leaves to both market and government  
institutions just a marginal place. However, is it families that stand as the most 
efficient providers of social services or is it the state that leaves them a central role 
in taking care of all the duties of family care? Probably, both. The amount of 
resources at young people disposal is not long enough to ensure self-satisfaction of 
needs and full independence from a prominent role of family, while the role which 
the market can play is significant just in case of lower prices in turn for more 
efficient services or, at least, in relation to the households’ income; if not, this 
results in a welfare stratification. One might say that, historically, the aim of social 
policy in conservative welfare states is the maintenance of traditional status 
differences in society, as a sort of “natural” social stratification which resulted from 
the intent to increase the role of the government, together with the other traditional 
entities just like families. Then, national governments of corporatist welfare regimes 
actually support the principle of subsidiarity since the social doctrine of the Roman 
 77 
 
Catholic Church, which recommends that social issues should be handled by the 
least centralised authority or the smallest social units as often as possible and only 
when the single individuals or local organizations fail to achieve collective needs, 
should public institutions get involved. Therefore, on the one hand, the above 
principle applies; on the other hand, socio-economic factors and cultural heritage 
contributed to make the social stratification even worse and so that it should be dealt 
with. 
The long tradition of strong and supportive Italian family - practiced on a regular 
basis in some areas of the country, especially in the middle and south of Italy- could 
be tested through specific social indicators which give an idea of the recent trends, 
such as the status of women’s presence in the labour market, social transfers for 
non-active household members, the social expenditure for family cash benefits and 
family services or the average age of young adults leaving the parental household, 
compared to other European countries, as clearly shown in Chart 1.A . Why do so 
many Italian young adults still live with their parents? Why is there such difference? 
It is almost clear that young people are the typical working-poor population in 
Europe: factors behind a very high average age of young adults moving out of the 
parental house are mainly a growing perception of too expensive house prices 
(including household bills and living arrangements) relative to their income and the 
increasing youth unemployment rate, which for the second quarter of 2014 is at 
41.5% (15-24) and 17.6% (25-34), forcing them to share a home with their own 
family. Therefore, the transition to independent adulthood is a process that seems to 
take place too slowly due to the prevalence of precarious work, poorly paid, carried 
out especially by the youth generation. The job insecurity and the temporary work as 
the most common form of precarious employment are the key to the future of Italian 
youth: young people who are newcomers to employment, without neither work 
experience nor professional skills, are highly exposed to the risk of precarity. Under 
these conditions, young adults wishing to live on their own encounter difficulties in 
acquiring a mortgage, developing new projects or simply planning a house 
ownership. The Global Housing Watch, which operates as housing markets 
observer, provides current data on house prices across countries, such as house 
price-to-rent and house price-to-income-ratios, on a quarterly basis. Although house 
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prices have gone down since 2007, as in Spain, Greece and Portugal, and despite the 
high home ownership rate, the increase in house and rent prices from 1998 to 2007 
grew faster than the income growth. Rent subsidies, below-market rents and other 
transfers to help with housing costs in Italy have impact on the disposable income as 
the rent paid throughout the entire working life is a share of the household’s income, 
and the empirical evidence showed that it is one of the few efficient targeted policies 
because it is a direct support to poverty. However, current transfers are too limited to 
be incisive: according to the OECD-SOCX database, the share of total social 
expenditure devoted to housing policies as % of GDP is dramatically low. In 
Baldini-Poggio (2010) the analysis of social housing in Italy confirms that public 
resources spent for housing transfers are insufficient not only to alleviate poverty 
(that should be fully faced by income maintenance policies) but even to reduce the 
burden of housing costs for low-income households. The distributive impact varies 
across generations (and across towns): older households are the most favourable 
category, whilst the coverage of younger tenants is very limited.  
 
Chart 1.A-1.B: Estimated average age of young adults leaving the parental 
household, 2012  
 
Source: EUROSTAT 
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On the one hand, social housing turned out to be definitely efficient to target but, on 
the other hand, a too limited incidence of transfers for renter emerged. Innovative 
local forms of supply are required to replace provisions of transfers that are mostly 
handled by central government, to reduce the side-effect of dependency and to 
coordinate transfers avoiding the bottleneck of whether it should be based either on 
the total resources of households or just on the rental contractor’s income. 
However, in the light of Chart 1.B, that shows young people aged 18-34 who still 
live with their parents, where the difference between Italy (65,8%) at the top of 
ranking and Denmark (15,8%) is huge. Financial crisis, economic downturn and 
youth unemployment rate heavily affecting households and young individuals are 
the chief explanation to these data, even though, however, it would be a more 
comprehensive outlook to ascribe the connections behind such great difference also 
to social reasons, nationally and locally, linked to the high degree of familialism in 
Italy: different cultural factors have a great impact and the degree of familialism 
does much bring to the interpretation of these data. Here too, it is no accident that 
the Scandinavian countries take place on the lower values of the scale, while 
countries of the Mediterranean region shows the highest percentage.  
In Berloffa-Villa (2007) the diffusion of home ownership in Italy as a consequence 
of the liberalisation of the mortgage market explains the limited amount of houses to 
rent at disposal. Even if the higher house prices increased the owner’s wealth until a 
few years ago, the equally high costs of housing services and annual property taxes 
cause an increase in prices which, in turn, have negative impact on those young 
adults looking for a house to rent. Moreover, according to OECD Pension at a 
Glance 2013 there is a sizeable income effect on housing in Italy due to the fact that 
many low-income households are also homeowners: in 2012 the Inland Revenue 
agency (Agenzia delle Entrate) confirmed that over 70% of homeowners have a very 
low income below 26.000 €. 
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5     Regression analysis on the employment 
rate for women in Italy  
 
After describing the main traits of the Italian welfare state and introducing 
comparative discussions on gender equality and family policies across Southern 
countries, questions to ask are whether the rate of female employment in Italy is 
responsive to an increase of total (public) social expenditure, to change in GDP per 
person and to variation in gender pay gap. The idea is to assess interactions between 
the dimension of gender equality and the three factors of economic performance of a 
country, welfare state and employment. De facto, richer countries have higher 
female employment rate and, in turn, countries like Norway and Denmark, for 
instance, where gender wage gap is very low, have also higher female employment 
rates. Taking Italy as reference, we consider a simple linear regression in order to 
estimate possible effects on the harmonized female employment rate of these 
variables, i.e. GDP per person, total public social expenditure and gender pay gap. 
The last one stands for a representation of the multidimensional concept of gender 
equality. As explained in the section describing the OECD Social Expenditure 
dataset, the collection of data for the specific institutional and economic settings 
comes from the European Commission database (Eurostat) for the first variable and 
from the OECD-SOCX Database for the latter ones. The focus of this study is on the 
impact of these independent variables on Italy’s female employment rate (FE) by 
running an OLS model estimation using the open source tool of Gretl.  
 
5.1 Data and Methodology 
 
Hypothesis that have been tested concern time series data from Italy that have been 
collected to estimate the impact on female employment rate (v1) at time t of the 
chosen variables, described below, as possible determinants using OLS regression to 
estimate the following relationship: 
FEi,t = β0 + EXPi,tβ1 + GDPi,tβ2 + GPGi,tβ3 + εi,t 
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This equation incorporates the employment rate (in percentage) for female 
population over 15 years and up to 64 years age as dependent variable, from the first 
quarter Q1 of 1997 to the third quarter Q3 of 2013. To test which component is most 
plausible to influence FE, the economic interpretation of the independent variables is 
as follows: 
 
 Per capita GDP (v2) is an aggregate measure of economic performance, 
already available on a quarterly basis (Eurostat database), and an indicator of the 
total output of a country according to the number of people: higher per capita GDP 
means higher standard of living. This variable is expected to be positively correlated 
to FE. 
 
 The aggregate public social expenditure (v3) as percentage of GDP, 
provided on a yearly basis, collects data on social spending in nine policy areas 
included family, housing and unemployment, which are the most pertinent branches 
to our analysis. Social programs have the power to increase the human development 
of a country and to provide a good picture of social policy priorities, structural 
shortcomings, government social planning. As mentioned earlier, the public social 
spending-to-GDP ratios is a good measure of the magnitude of the welfare state in 
cross-country comparisons and in Italy it remains at historically high levels, from 
the first quarter Q1 of 1997 (22.9%) to the third Q3 of 2013 (28.7%), constantly 
increasing year by year. It is also important to point out that, if one is interesting in 
the assessment of the evolution of the social expenditure, trends in spending and 
economic growth should have been separated and the social spending be measured 
in real terms: not how much a country devotes to welfare as a percentage of GDP, 
but patterns of real expenditure levels at current prices of national currency, as is 
clear in Fig.18 (Adema et alii, 2011). In case of economic downturn, social 
spending-to-GDP ratios can rise to ensure the fulfilment of social support towards 
the slower growth of GDP.  
Between 2007/2008 and 2011/2012 real social expenditure (SOCX) increased by 
2.4%, while real GDP decreased by about 7%. Italy is grouped with Portugal among 
countries with below-average growth of both GDP and public social spending. The 
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crisis causedan increase in social expenditure In Italy: since 2007 it begun to grow 
up.  
Fig. 18: Real public social spending and real GDP (index 100 in 2007) and public 
social spending in % of GDP (right scale), 2007-2012 
 
 
Source: OECD-SOCX 
 
Given the importance of estimating the relationship between labour market and 
child-care policies, it would have been interesting to opt for social spending on 
family benefits, still delivered by OECD. Since the 2000s, spending on family 
support was very high in Italy and varied between 1.3% of GDP in 2000 to 1.5% in 
2011. However, data for 2012 and 2013 are missing and estimates are available only 
for aggregates. Moreover, to be more precisely, if we had wanted to collect all the 
information on social spending on family to capture all comprehensive social 
support to households and working women, we did also include data on ‘Other 
social services’ from the OECD database which embrace not only services to the 
elderly and disabled, but also ALMPs, housing and family, such as income-tested 
spending on the unemployed and income-tested family cash transfers.   
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However, in the interest of this work the public social expenditure in % of GDP is 
the best choice. In order to obtain quarterly data, the time-series has been converted 
from annual to quarterly and divided into four intervals.   
 
 The gender pay gap (v4) is in unadjusted form, on a yearly basis, and 
defined as the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid 
employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly 
earnings of male paid employees. It measures the wage gap between the two genders 
concerning discrepancies in employment and family issues. Data are collected from 
1997 to 2013 and, from reference year 2008 onwards, data have been found through 
a new methodology (NACE). Since neither Eurostat nor OECD databases provide 
data on a quarterly basis, the assumption that gender gaps in wages do not vary from 
one quarter to the next has been applied in order to take the same frequency data. 
 εi,t ~ WN (0,σ
2
) 
 
5.2  Conclusions 
 
After running the OLS regression, this study empirically tests the effects of these 
three selected variables by producing the following information from the regression 
output: 
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Impact of GDP per person (v2) on female employment rate (v1), 1997- 
2013 
According to the correlation coefficient estimated between the two variables, there is 
no statistically significant effect of a higher level of per capita GDP per person. P-
value test fails and the null hypothesis can’t be rejected. Wherever there is no star, 
the parameter is statistically different from 0. Therefore, our model suggests there is 
no reason to believe that the level of productivity in Italy has a large effect on 
female employment.  
 
Impact of public social expenditure (v3) on female employment rate (v1),    
1997-2013 
The relationship between these two variables is positive, as clearly shown by the 
first regression line, and statistically significant. This result suggests that as the 
public social spending increases, the female employment goes upward as well. 
Moreover, the presence of three stars *** at v3 suggests that p-value test at level of 
significance α=0.01 is passed, i.e. v3 ≠ 0 and the statistical significance is at 100%. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the observed effect actually reflects the positive 
reaction of the female employment rate to a change in government social spending. 
 
Impact of gender pay gap (v4) on female employment rate (v1), 1997-   
2013 
With regards to the third variable used, the small number of observations does not 
fully ensure the accuracy of the inference. As expected, there is a negative 
correlation between these two variables: as the gender wage gap decreases, then the 
female employment increase. However, this coefficient narrowly fails p-value test, 
so it is statistically not significant.  
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6 Conclusions  
 
In this work the analysis of the roots of the Italian welfare state and its Southern 
form of social policy model has been introduced by the specifications of the 
different welfare regimes across Europe. It has been carried out to end up with an 
assessment of possible connections between some of the major forces affecting the 
way of production and distribution of welfare: social expenditure, distortions of the 
labour market, economic inequalities, institutional rigidities. Thanks to Ferrera’s 
work that have made the most comprehensive contribution on how the Italian 
welfare evolved over time, it has been possible to work along one of the lines laid 
down by his work: from the high degree of familialism, that is an interesting thread 
in common with all other South European countries, to the objectives of family 
policies and the role of women between work and family life, also compared to other 
OECD countries, like France and Sweden. These topics, which have all been 
inspired by the theme of family, cannot be separated from a view to labour market 
and to socio-economic trajectories around women, child and economic and social 
inclusion. Gender inequality in Italy starts to be seen as a key objective to improve 
its growth, social cohesion, competitiveness and efficient labour markets. The well-
being of both parents and children in Italy as is today has shown some limits: Italy is 
still backward on gender equality policies, in which Portugal is actively committed 
and the reconciliation of work and family life policies are outdated and poor of 
targeted initiatives, like the Gender Equality Bonus and the reservation month 
introduced by Sweden. Greece has the worst current provision of family policies, 
and appears to score lower than even central and eastern European countries. 
Certain peculiarities of the current welfare design, like the male-breadwinner model, 
the pension-heavy character due to the PAYG public pension scheme and the lack of 
a full national aid programme to families, set narrow limits to the achievement of 
gender equality and an optimal reconciliation between family responsibilities and 
career path in these four countries. The financial pressure to restrict expenditure on 
social aims and the higher vulnerable-to-poverty families calling for a more social 
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spending from government would require a harmonisation of state intervention into 
new economic and social opportunities.  
Conducting the econometric analysis on the relationships between female 
employment rate and these variables from 1997 to 2013 in Italy has proved the 
positive impact of a lower gender disparity in wages on the percentage of women in 
labour force that are employed. Results from this study have been supported by a 
robust literature. 
Nowadays the Jobs Act that the Italian government is dealing with has placed the 
issue of maternity among its highest priorities by reforming some regulations 
governing the Italian labour market: specifically, the right to paid maternity leave 
will be extended to working women even in case of unpaid social security 
contributions by the employer. Moreover, women on fixed term contracts will enjoy 
the same leave rights as women on permanent contracts so leave period would be 
fully counted as “working” period thus introducing more opportunities for mothers-
to-be and new mothers. However, the route out of gender inequality and families in 
distress strictly depends on the key determinants highlighted by the several 
comparisons within the other South European countries and across countries of other 
welfare traditions.  
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